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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL AND 
PRECLUSION DOCTRINES IN CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY CASES; VOLUME I OF II: ESTOPPEL* 
K.M. LEWIS** & PAUL M. LOPEZ*** 
Since the last major article on estoppel and preclusion doctrines in 
bankruptcy law was released in 2005,1 courts have issued a number of 
decisions that have affected the operation of estoppel and preclusion 
principles in consumer bankruptcy cases. If practitioners do not keep 
abreast of these developments, they run the risk that unclear language in 
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 1. See Christopher Klein et al., Principles of Preclusion and Estoppel in Bankruptcy 
Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839 (2005); see also, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner & Robert B. 
Chapman, Take What You Can, Give Nothing Back: Judicial Estoppel, Employment 
Discrimination, Bankruptcy, and Piracy in the Courts, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2005); David 
Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 351 (2009); James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Judicial Estoppel and the 
Eleventh Circuit Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1115 (2005); Robert F. 
Dugas, Note, Honing a Blunt Instrument: Refining the Use of Judicial Estoppel in 
Bankruptcy Nondisclosure Cases, 59 VAND. L. REV. 205 (2006); Eric Hilmo, Note, Bankrupt 
Estoppel: The Case for a Uniform Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel As Applied Against Former 
Bankruptcy Debtors, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353 (2012); Steven Jackson, Comment, Heavy 
Backpacks: Res Judicata and Appropriate Notice to Creditors During a Student Loan 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 235 (2009).  
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court filings or inadvertent (or advertent) omissions at the beginning of a 
bankruptcy case will return to haunt both them and their clients. This 
danger is especially acute in the bankruptcy context because estoppel and 
preclusion are partially uncodified common law doctrines. As such, they are 
easily overlooked by bankruptcy practitioners, who are understandably 
accustomed to working within a closed statutory code.2 
It is not enough, however, to know that these doctrines exist; the 
practitioner must also understand the nuances of each and the differences 
between them.3 Each has distinct elements, and different policies and 
theories underlie them. The failure to distinguish between varieties of 
estoppel or preclusion in court filings may result in the court applying a 
doctrine that the litigant did not intend to plead.4 
This article, presented in two volumes, canvasses post-2005 consumer5 
bankruptcy decisions on the subjects of judicial estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, claim preclusion (also known as res judicata6), and issue 
preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel7). The former two doctrines 
will be discussed in this volume; the latter two will be discussed in a future 
volume. The article will treat each preclusive doctrine in a separate part. 
Each part will first define the doctrine and distinguish it from similar but 
distinct doctrines and then briefly summarize cases of interest. Each part 
will conclude with important takeaways not only for attorneys who practice 
in the field of consumer bankruptcy, but also for nonbankruptcy attorneys 
representing consumers who have gone through bankruptcy, are currently in 
bankruptcy, or who may declare bankruptcy in the future. Where possible 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Klein et al., supra note 1, at 839-40. 
 3. “Incantations such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or equitable 
estoppel, often lead courts into summary resolution of actions without being precise about 
the niceties of the doctrines being invoked. Imprecision, while expedient, tends to produce 
unfortunate consequences in the case at hand and future actions.” Id. at 839. 
 4. See Sharpe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Sharpe), 391 B.R. 117, 164 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2008) (“The plaintiffs do not identify the type of estoppel the Court should apply. 
There are many. Based on the complaint, the Court presumes it is one of the two most 
frequently raised. Those are ‘judicial estoppel’ and ‘equitable estoppel.’”). 
 5. For recent developments on these topics in the field of corporate bankruptcy, see 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009); Jones v. Estate of Cole, 483 F. App’x 
468 (10th Cir. 2012); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re Adelphia 
Recovery Trust), 634 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 2011); Logan Med. Found., Inc. v. Hayflich & 
Steinberg (In re Logan Med. Found., Inc.), 346 B.R. 184 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 2006). 
 6. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 722-23 (5th ed. 1994) (citing D. 
Allan Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29 (1964)). 
 7. Id. (citing Vestal, supra note 6). 
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and appropriate, the article offers theories for reconciling doctrinal 
divisions and suggestions for reform. 
I. Judicial Estoppel 
A. Definition 
Judicial estoppel, also known as the “doctrine of the conclusiveness of 
the judgment”8 or the “doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions,”9 is 
a “judicially created doctrine” that “seeks to prevent a litigant from 
asserting a position that is inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a 
previous proceeding.”10 If a party takes an inconsistent position in the same 
or a prior proceeding,11 and a court had previously adopted the former 
position, then an opposing party can raise judicial estoppel as a defense or 
the court may dismiss the case sua sponte.12 
Judicial estoppel differs in relevant respects from claim preclusion, 
commonly known as res judicata. Whereas claim preclusion is “designed to 
protect the finality of judgments,” judicial estoppel “is concerned not with 
the repose of individual claims but with the ability of courts to render their 
                                                                                                                 
 8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. (emphasis added). “Judicial estoppel” is by far the most common of these three 
terms, and it is also the shortest and most convenient. Accordingly, this article will use that 
term to the exclusion of the other two. 
Note, however, that in a few jurisdictions the doctrine of inconsistent positions is a 
distinct doctrine that “is broader than judicial estoppel and may apply to positions taken 
outside of litigation.” Timberland Bancshares, Inc. v. Garrison (In re Garrison), 462 B.R. 
666, 683 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 10. E.g., Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
Morgan Cnty. Hosp. v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). For the 
historical development of judicial estoppel, see Dugas, supra note 1, at 211-16. 
 11. “[Judicial estoppel] is not only limited to asserting inconsistent positions in the same 
litigation, but also is appropriate to bar litigants from making incompatible statements in two 
different cases.” Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 WL 
109065, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008) (citation omitted). 
The more common approach is to allow the application of judicial estoppel in either the 
same proceeding or a prior one, but some courts hold that judicial estoppel can apply only in 
a later proceeding. See In re Shethi, 389 B.R. 588, 607 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008); Beiner & 
Chapman, supra note 1, at 68-69 (contending that judicial estoppel makes more sense in the 
context of alleged inter-case inconsistencies than intra-case inconsistencies). 
 12. William Houston Brown et al., Debtors’ Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine of 
Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 197-202 (2001); see 
also In re Boates, No. Civ.A. 05-4353, 2006 WL 166569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006) 
(citing Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1992)); Dugas, supra 
note 1, at 208. 
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decisions based on faithful representations by counsel.”13 “[T]he doctrine of 
judicial estoppel has broader preclusive effects than . . . issue preclusion,” 
insofar as judicial estoppel “bar[s] not only an inconsistent position with 
respect to [a legal issue] but also all successive claims inconsistent with that 
representation.”14 
“[N]o single or uniform set of judicial estoppel elements exists” at 
present.15 In New Hampshire v. Maine,16 a nonbankruptcy case, the 
Supreme Court established “several factors [that] typically inform the 
decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case,”17 be that case a 
bankruptcy case or otherwise: 
 1. a party has taken a position in a legal proceeding that is 
“clearly inconsistent”18 with a position that party has taken 
previously in either the same or a separate legal proceeding; 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re Adelphia Recovery Trust), 634 
F.3d 678, 697 (2d Cir. 2011). One commentator wrote: 
Among the various preclusive doctrines, that of res judicata [also known as 
claim preclusion] is most similar to judicial estoppel, though there are 
important distinctions. Unlike res judicata, judicial estoppel does not require a 
“final judgment” in a prior proceeding to be invoked. Likewise, the doctrine is 
often invoked where the estopped party’s prior inconsistent position was 
advanced in a nonjudicial proceeding. Judicial estoppel may bar subsequent 
litigation even where the preceding legal action was unrelated to the present 
case. Thus, unlike res judicata, nonparties with no expressed interest in the 
prior litigation may invoke judicial estoppel in the second proceeding.  
Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1359-60 (citations omitted). 
 14. Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1358-59 (citations omitted) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 15. Brown et al., supra note 12, at 199; accord Alec P. Ostrow, Nondisclosure as a 
Basis for Judicial Estoppel in Bankruptcy, or Estop Me If You Haven’t Heard This Before, in 
NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 123, 142 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 2011 
ed.) (claiming “there are no universally accepted elements of the [judicial estoppel] 
doctrine”); Dugas, supra note 1, at 209 (“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel stands for 
different principles in different jurisdictions.”). 
 16. 532 U.S. 742 (2001). 
 17. Id. at 750. 
 18. For a helpful analysis of what it means for two positions to be clearly inconsistent, 
see Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re Cotter), Bankr. No. 08-12504, Adversary No. 11-
01619, 2011 WL 5900811, at *6-7 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011). 
In the context of the inconsistent position element, some courts have stated that “if the 
statements or positions in question can be reconciled in some way, estoppel does not apply.” 
Negron v. Weiss, No. 06-CV-1288(CBA), 2006 WL 2792769, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2006) (citing Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/2
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 2. that party “has succeeded in persuading a court to accept 
that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an 
inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create ‘the 
perception that either the first or the second court was misled;’” 
and 
 3. that party “would derive an unfair advantage or impose an 
unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”19  
Despite articulating this list of factors, the Supreme Court conceded that 
“[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be 
invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of 
principle.”20 The Court therefore emphasized: “In enumerating these 
factors, we do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive 
formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel. Additional 
considerations may inform the doctrine’s application in specific factual 
contexts.”21 As a result, some circuits consider additional elements in the 
bankruptcy context.22 The most common additional elements are whether 
the party’s assertion of an inconsistent position was inadvertent,23 and 
whether “the facts at issue are the same in both cases.”24 Other circuits 
                                                                                                                 
 19. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51 (citations omitted). 
 20. Id. at 750 (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)). 
 21. Id. at 751; accord Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
 22. See, e.g., Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed 
v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)) (adding the element of 
advertence); Mayes v. Walgreen Co., No. 08 CV 5105, 2009 WL 1312957, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2009) (citing United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2003)) (adding 
the element that the facts at issue must be the same in both cases); Stramiello-Yednak v. 
Perl, No. Civ.A. 05-517, 2006 WL 1158123, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2006) (citing Krystal 
Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 
2003)) (adding the element that “no less sanction would adequately remedy the damage done 
by the litigant’s misconduct”). But see Arkison v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 P.3d 13, 17 (Wash. 
2007) (Sanders, J., concurring) (“The three core factors as set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court and relied on by the majority supply all the elements a trial court needs to 
determine whether judicial estoppel applies. Rather than crafting additional considerations, 
trial courts should simply rely upon these three factors to guide their analysis.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Love, 677 F.3d at 261 (citing Reed, 650 F.3d at 574). 
 24. Mayes, 2009 WL 1312957, at *3 (citing Christian, 342 F.3d at 747); see also Biggs 
v. AM Gen., LLC, No. 3:07-CV-28 JVB, 2008 WL 1957864, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 1, 2008); 
Swearingen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 456 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2006); 
accord Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“There must be 
a discernible connection between the two proceedings. . . . [A] court may not invoke judicial 
estoppel against a party who has engaged in misconduct in a separate proceeding if that 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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inquire whether “the risk of inconsistent results with its impact on judicial 
integrity is certain.”25 Still other courts, particularly in the Third Circuit, 
follow the additional requirement that judicial estoppel may not be 
employed “unless it is tailored to address the harm identified and no less 
sanction would adequately remedy the damage done by the litigant’s 
misconduct.”26 In some jurisdictions, such as the Fourth Circuit, “the 
position sought to be estopped must be one of fact rather than law or legal 
theory.”27  
Unlike equitable estoppel,28 judicial estoppel is intended to protect the 
integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants.29 Accordingly, whether any 
party “relie[s] on [the position advanced by the party sought to be estopped] 
is irrelevant because detrimental reliance is not a required element of 
judicial estoppel.”30  
Interestingly, several circuits and districts, at least in the bankruptcy 
context, have occasionally eliminated, or at least diminished the importance 
of, some of the elements set forth by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire, 
particularly the “unfair advantage”/“unfair detriment” prong.31 Eliminating 
                                                                                                                 
proceeding is unrelated to the current proceeding.”). But see Hansford v. Bank of Am., Civ. 
Action No. 07-4716, 2008 WL 4078460, at *9 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (“[B]ecause the 
doctrine aims to protect the court’s interest, rather than any individual party’s, it is not 
necessary that the two proceedings . . . be related . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 25. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re Adelphia Recovery Trust), 634 
F.3d 678, 696 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting DeRosa v. Nat’l Envelope Corp., 595 F.3d 99, 103 (2d 
Cir. 2010)). 
 26. Stramiello-Yednak, 2006 WL 1158123, at *3 (citing Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319); 
accord Hansford, 2008 WL 4078460, at *10 (citing Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. 
Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 779-80 (3d Cir. 2001)); In re Boates, No. Civ.A. 05-4353, 
2006 WL 166569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006) (citing Montrose, 243 F.3d at 784-85). 
 27. Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. E.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re Oparaji), 698 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 
2012) (citing Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th 
Cir. 1999)). 
 30. Hancock Bank v. Bates (In re Bates), Bankr. No. 09–51279–NPO, Adversary No. 
09–05092–NPO, 2010 WL 2203634, at *14 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 27, 2010). 
 31. See Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 11-12 (citing Wakefield v. SWC Sec., Inc. 
(In re Wakefield), 293 B.R. 372, 378 (N.D. Tex. 2003)); see also Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 
10, 16-17, 19 (1st Cir. 2012); Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 
118 (2d Cir. 2004); Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 
2003); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002); Browning v. 
Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th Cir. 2002). 
But see Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 235 (noting that judicial estoppel is “particularly” 
appropriate “where ‘intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/2
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or deemphasizing this element has some logical appeal, even if doing so is 
in tension with binding Supreme Court precedent and has been derided by 
some commentators.32 If the purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the 
courts rather than the litigants, then it seems somewhat irrelevant whether 
any of the litigants have been unfairly disadvantaged or harmed.33 
More troublingly, some courts have applied judicial estoppel without 
considering the element of judicial acceptance.34 If judicial estoppel is 
intended to preserve the integrity of the courts,  then it seems incredibly 
problematic to prevent a litigant from having her day in court without 
considering whether a court has accepted an inconsistent opinion made by 
that litigant. 
State courts sometimes have idiosyncratic sets of judicial estoppel 
elements; this can make the question of whether the court should apply 
federal or state law in any given case particularly important.35 
Given the foregoing, this article’s first takeaway is that practitioners 
should not necessarily feel restricted by the way that courts in their 
jurisdiction have defined the elements of judicial estoppel. In other words, 
if a particular element would particularly help or harm one’s case, and if 
there is a good faith legal argument for adopting it in the case at hand,36 the 
practitioner should not hesitate to respectfully request that the court 
consider or disregard that element in the interests of equity and tailor the 
doctrine to the particular facts of each case. 
Given the looseness of the judicial estoppel inquiry, courts considering 
whether to dismiss a claim on judicial estoppel grounds are typically guided 
by policy considerations. These include (1) “preserv[ing] the sanctity of 
litigants’ oaths,” (2) avoiding inconsistent results or multiple recoveries, (3) 
                                                                                                                 
unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice’” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008))); Ryan Operations 
G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362-64 (3d Cir. 1996); Beiner & 
Chapman, supra note 1, at 20 (citing Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 
2006) as an example of a case retaining the unfair advantage/unfair detriment element). 
 32. See Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
 33. See Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1377. 
 34. See Thompson v. O’Bryant, No. 08 C 68, 2008 WL 1924954 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 
2008). 
 35. See, e.g., Garcia v. BNSF Ry. Co., 387 S.W.3d 763, 766 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App., Feb. 22, 
2012); Markley v. Markley, 198 P.2d 486, 491 (Wash. 1948) (listing six factors). See 
generally Hilmo, supra note 1. 
 36. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)-(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c). Hereinafter, “RULE” or 
“RULES” shall refer to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, while the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure will be cited as normal. 
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preventing litigants from misleading courts, (4) preventing litigants “from 
using the judicial system for undeserved personal gain,” and (5) 
“minimiz[ing] the misuse of judicial resources.”37  
Pleading in the alternative generally does not trigger judicial estoppel.38 
“‘[I]t is winning, twice, on the basis of incompatible positions’ that offends 
the doctrine.”39  
In some circuits, primarily the Second Circuit, the “subjective intent” to 
assert inconsistent positions before the court is far less important to the 
judicial estoppel inquiry than “objective conduct.”40 An outright lie to the 
court is often sufficient, but not necessary, to trigger the application of 
judicial estoppel.41 
In most circuits, whether to dismiss on judicial estoppel grounds is 
putatively committed to the court’s discretion.42 Indeed, several courts have 
exercised discretion to refuse to apply judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Erie for Judicial 
Estoppel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 875-76 (1997). 
 38. See Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1360-61. That said, some courts have held that “[t]he 
doctrine extends to inconsistent positions of law as well as fact.” Harris Bank, N.A. v. 
Werner (In re Werner), 386 B.R. 684, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing In re Cassidy, 892 
F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 39. Brown, supra note 12, at 201 (quoting Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. 
Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990)); accord In re Kelly, 350 B.R. 
778, 792 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that judicial estoppel is inappropriate in “situations 
where the party did not prevail in the first matter” (citing United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 
917, 921 (7th Cir. 2001))). But see Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1362 (“[J]udicial estoppel may be 
applied in cases where a litigant did not ultimately prevail on his case in chief, but convinced 
a tribunal to rely on his representation to reach some conclusion in a prior case.” (citing 
Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
 40. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re Adelphia Recovery Trust), 634 
F.3d 678, 696 (2d Cir. 2011); accord Becker v. Verizon North, Inc., 2007 WL 1224039, at 
*1 (7th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007); Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 26 
(E.D. Cal. 2006); Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E.2d 1218, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). But see 
Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361-65 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Taylor v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (E.D. Ark. 2003) 
(requiring “intentional or deliberate manipulation” (emphasis added)). 
 41. E.g., Adelphia, 634 F.3d at 696; see also Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 16, 20 n.7 
(1st Cir. 2012) (“‘[P]laying fast and loose with the courts’ . . . [is] not a prerequisite for 
application of [judicial estoppel]. ‘A party is not automatically excused from judicial 
estoppel if the earlier statement was made in good faith.’” (citations omitted)). But see Ryan 
Operations, 81 F.3d at 361-65. 
 42. E.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 201. See also Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 
F.3d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that abuse of 
discretion is the majority position). But see Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th Cir. 
2002) (applying a de novo standard of review). 
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context even after finding that all elements of judicial estoppel recognized 
in the relevant jurisdiction were met.43  
Nevertheless, even though appellate courts purportedly employ a highly 
deferential standard when reviewing a lower court’s decision to judicially 
estop a litigant or not,44 appellate courts regularly reverse judicial estoppel 
decisions in the consumer bankruptcy context for abuse of discretion.45 The 
standard of review actually applied in consumer bankruptcy-related judicial 
estoppel cases appears much closer to de novo; courts review applicable 
case law and then state as a matter of law that judicial estoppel is either 
warranted or not.46 Indeed, some circuits, particularly the Sixth Circuit, 
explicitly review judicial estoppel decisions de novo,47 and other courts 
occasionally review judicial estoppel determinations either (1) without 
articulating a standard of review48 or (2) using the typical standard of 
review for a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss without 
indicating that the presence of a discretionary judicial estoppel 
determination affects the standard applied.49 The D.C. Circuit has explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See, e.g., Byrd v. Wyeth, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805 (S.D. Miss. 2012); 
Gilbreath v. Averitt Express, Inc., Civ. Action No. 09-1922, 2010 WL 4554090, at *7-10 
(W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2010). 
 44. Cf. In re Boates, No. Civ.A. 05-4353, 2006 WL 166569, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 
2006) (“The burden for showing an abuse of discretion is heavy; abuse is found ‘only where 
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the [lower] court.’” (quoting Lindy Bros. 
Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976))). 
 45. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re Oparaji), 698 F.3d 231, 235, 238 
(5th Cir. 2012); Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1053 (8th Cir. 2006); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, 
Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004). Cf. Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 365 
(reversing lower court’s judicial estoppel decision in chapter 11 corporate reorganization 
case). 
In addition, courts sometimes reverse a lower court’s decision to judicially estop a 
litigant on the grounds that the litigant was not “given the opportunity to present exculpatory 
evidence” showing “mistake or inadvertence.” Rossi v. Westenhoefer (In re Rossi), No. 11-
8048, 2012 WL 913732, at *9 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Muse v. Accord Human Res., Inc., 129 F. App’x 487 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 47. See, e.g., Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Browning, 283 F.3d at 775. 
 48. See, e.g., Phillips v. Flying J Inc., 375 S.W.3d 367, 368-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). 
 49. See, e.g., Becker v. Verizon N., Inc., No. 06-2956, 2007 WL 1224039, at *1 (7th 
Cir. Apr. 25, 2007); Guerra v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., Civ. Action No. H-06-1444, 
2007 WL 419517, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2007); Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E.2d 1218, 1225-
26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Garcia v. BNSF Ry. Co., 387 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2012); Norris v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 362 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). But 
see Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Typically, a district court’s grant of 
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refused to decide the applicable standard of review.50 Our research has not 
revealed any cases in which an appellate court stated that it might reach a 
different result on the judicial estoppel question were it considering the 
question de novo, but nonetheless deferred to the lower court’s judgment, 
though we certainly do not rule out the possibility that cases along these 
lines may exist. 
Thus, practitioners seeking to reverse adverse judicial estoppel 
judgments on appeal should not allow the rhetoric of discretion to deter 
them from tactfully asking the appellate court to scrutinize the lower court’s 
decision. Note, however, that reviewing judicial estoppel decisions de novo, 
whether explicitly or sub rosa, appears inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in New Hampshire v. Maine that “judicial estoppel ‘is 
an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.’”51  
Like many equitable remedies, one may not invoke judicial estoppel with 
unclean hands,52 such as where the party seeking estoppel has suborned 
perjury in a prior, related proceeding.53 One need not have been a party to 
the prior proceeding to invoke judicial estoppel; nor is there any 
requirement that the entity seeking to invoke judicial estoppel be in privity 
to a party in the prior proceeding.54  
  
                                                                                                                 
summary judgment is reviewed de novo. However, when reviewing application of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘the applicable rubric is abuse of discretion.’ . . . [T]he abuse of 
discretion standard is appropriate even when reviewing a judicial estoppel ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)). 
 50. Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 51. 532 U.S. 742, 750 (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
In dicta of an unpublished opinion, a panel of the Sixth Circuit noted this tension with 
binding Supreme Court precedent, as well as the fact that the Sixth Circuit’s use of a de novo 
standard of review is far and away the minority position. See Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
141 F. App’x 420, 423-24 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In light of New Hampshire and the extensive 
contrary authority, we question the continued use of the de novo standard in the context of 
judicial estoppel. Nevertheless, because we find that the district court’s ruling was proper 
under either standard, we need not resolve the issue here.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 WL 
109065, at *7 n.3 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008); Mason v. Lowe (In re Mason), Bankr. No. 11–
10251, Adversary No. 11–1042, 2012 WL 733834, at *7-9 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 
2012). 
 53. See, e.g., Mason, 2012 WL 733834, at *8. 
 54. E.g., Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358-61 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
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B. Recent Developments 
Within the consumer bankruptcy context, the most common application 
of judicial estoppel occurs when a debtor fails to satisfy the disclosure 
requirements established by the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)55 and Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the Rules).56 
In return for the bankruptcy relief debtors receive through 
gaining a discharge, the [Code] requires disclosure of all 
interests in property, the location of all assets, prior and ongoing 
business and personal transactions, and, foremost, honesty. The 
failure to comply with the requirements of disclosure and 
veracity necessarily affects the creditors, the application of the 
[Code], and the public’s respect for the bankruptcy system as 
well as the judicial system as a whole. . . . The Code requires 
nothing less than a full and complete disclosure of any and all 
apparent interests of any kind.57  
Accordingly, the Code requires all debtors to file a “schedule of assets 
and liabilities . . . [and] a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs.”58 
Property of the bankruptcy estate is “construed as broadly as possible”59 to 
include not only “claims or causes of action existing at the time the 
bankruptcy case is filed,”60 but also certain post-bankruptcy causes of 
action.61 A debtor’s duty to disclose assets is therefore “ongoing.”62 
Consequently, “Schedule B” of a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules requires 
the debtor “to list all ‘contingent and unliquidated claims of every 
nature, . . . counterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims.’”63 At 
least one court has interpreted the word “and” in “contingent and 
unliquidated . . . as being disjunctive so that the petitioner is directed to list 
all contingent claims and all unliquidated claims,” rather than conjunctive 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Hereinafter, we shall use “CODE” to refer to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 
101-1532 (2012). 
 56. Brown, supra note 12, at 202. See generally Ostrow, supra note 15; Dugas, supra 
note 1. 
 57. Fokkena v. Tripp (In re Tripp), 224 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998) (citations 
omitted). 
 58. CODE § 521(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 59. In re Stewart, 452 B.R. 726, 741 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2011). 
 60. Brown, supra note 12, at 202 (citing CODE § 541(a)(1) (1994)). 
 61. See CODE §§ 1207(a)(1); 1306(a)(1) (2012). 
 62. Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Kamont v. West, 83 F. App’x 1, 3 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 63. Brown, supra note 12, at 203 (quoting OFFICIAL BANKR. FORMS, FORM 6, ¶ 20). 
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such that the petitioner need only disclose claims that are both contingent 
and unliquidated.64 “The obvious thrust of the question is to elicit a 
complete disclosure of all potential assets that could be marshaled to satisfy 
the bankruptcy estate’s obligations . . . . Any more restrictive interpretation 
would be clearly contrary to controlling case law.”65 
Failure to make these disclosures can result in dismissal of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy case pursuant to § 521(i) of the Code.66 “Additionally, courts 
have ample power to punish debtors who wrongfully conceal assets”67 with 
sanctions,68 conversion to a chapter 7 liquidation,69 or denial/revocation of 
discharge.70 But the punishments do not end there: as will become apparent 
in the following text and footnotes, many courts have held that “[j]udicial 
estoppel is particularly appropriate where . . . a party fails to disclose an 
asset to a bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in a separate tribunal 
based on that undisclosed asset.”71 
That said, the doctrine of judicial estoppel in consumer bankruptcy is in a 
state of disarray.72 Circuit splits abound. Even within the same circuit it is 
often difficult to predict how a given court will rule in a particular case. As 
one court pithily described in a recent decision: 
Disagreement among jurists and discord in [judicial estoppel] 
case outcomes has been caused by a motley assortment of 
suspicious behavior by suspected dissembling debtors; a group 
of technical, inscrutable, overlapping, and inconsistent 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 26 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Code § 521(i) provides a mechanism for dismissal of the bankruptcy case itself. It is 
therefore distinct from dismissal of a subsequent lawsuit on judicial estoppel grounds. 
 67. Valdez v. JDR LLC, No. CV 04-1620-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2038456, at *3 (D. 
Ariz. July 20, 2006). 
 68. See RULE 9011. 
 69. E.g., CODE § 1307(c) (2012). 
 70. E.g., id. § 1328(e). 
 71. E.g., Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 72. Contra Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1353-54, 1363, 1373-74 (arguing that federal 
judicial estoppel law in the consumer bankruptcy context is largely uniform). Mr. Hilmo’s 
article is useful and very well written, but we think it overstates the degree of uniformity 
between the various federal jurisdictions, even while acknowledging interjurisdictional 
doctrinal variation. We do agree with Mr. Hilmo’s argument that federal judicial estoppel 
doctrine is at least more uniform than it used to be, however. See id. at 1373-74. We also 
agree that some aspects of judicial estoppel law are increasingly treated in a uniform 
manner, especially on the issue of whether an innocent trustee should be estopped because of 
a culpable debtor’s nondisclosure. In many other areas, however, lack of uniformity is the 
norm. 
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bankruptcy statutes; an ignorance of bankruptcy procedures and 
practicalities by non-bankruptcy courts and practitioners; . . . and 
an endless variance in the circumstances of individual cases.73 
This brings us to another preliminary takeaway: panta rhei.74 For nearly 
every “thrust” a practitioner may make for her client, there exists an equal 
and opposite “parry” that her opponent may cite.75 This article provides 
citations for many potential thrusts and parries so that debtors’ and 
creditors’ attorneys alike may assemble their arsenal from the footnotes. 
Nonetheless, some aspects of judicial estoppel are clear, and even where 
courts remain divided, useful guidance for practitioners can be gleaned 
from the chaos. The article also offers guidance regarding how judges 
should apply judicial estoppel in consumer bankruptcy cases. 
1. An Innocent Chapter 7 Trustee May Pursue a Claim That a Debtor 
Fails to Disclose 
In 2011, the Fifth Circuit, in an en banc opinion reversing a three-judge 
panel of the court, ruled in Reed v. City of Arlington that judicial estoppel 
did not bar a chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee from pursuing and collecting a 
consumer debtor’s judgment against his former employer, the City of 
Arlington, Texas, under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).76 The 
debtor “concealed the judgment during bankruptcy” from both the court and 
his bankruptcy attorney by failing to list on his bankruptcy schedules either 
the judgment against the city or his associated legal fees.77 Therefore, the 
debtor was judicially estopped from pursuing the claim himself,78 a result in 
accord with case law of numerous jurisdictions.79 Nevertheless, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Thompson v. Quarles, 392 B.R. 517, 526 (S.D. Ga. 2008). One might fairly accuse 
the court in Thompson of further exacerbating rather than mitigating said disagreement and 
discord. See infra note 117. 
 74. “All things are in flux;” literally, “everything flows.” See Heraclitus, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heraclitus#Panta_rhei.2C_.22everything_flows.22 (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2013). 
 75. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons of About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND L. REV. 395 (1950). 
 76. 650 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 77. Id. at 572-73. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006) (“All six appellate 
courts that have considered [the] question [as of 2006, i.e., the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,] hold that a debtor in bankruptcy who denies owning an asset, 
including a chose in action or other legal claim, cannot realize on that concealed asset after 
the bankruptcy ends.”). The Seventh Circuit joined these six circuits in Cannon-Stokes. Id.; 
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held as “a general rule that, absent unusual circumstances, an innocent 
trustee can pursue for the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action 
that the debtor fails to disclose in bankruptcy.”80 
The debtor in Reed had received a no-asset discharge, and his bankruptcy 
case had been closed.81 When the debtor’s nondisclosure came to light, 
however, the trustee reopened the case pursuant to Code § 350(b), 
successfully obtained a revocation of the debtor’s discharge, and substituted 
herself as the real party in interest in the FMLA litigation against the City.82 
The City argued that the debtor’s wrongdoing barred the trustee from 
collecting the judgment on judicial estoppel grounds.83 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court explained that in the bankruptcy 
context judicial estoppel must be applied “‘against the backdrop of the 
bankruptcy system and the ends it seeks to achieve.’”84 Under the Code, the 
debtor is a distinct entity from the debtor’s estate, and the chapter 7 
trustee’s duty is to maximize the value of the latter to thereby maximize 
creditor return.85 Recognizing that a debtor’s “failure to fully and honestly 
disclose all [of his or her] assets undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy 
system,” the court concluded that “judicial estoppel must be applied in such 
a way as to deter dishonest debtors . . . while protecting the rights of 
creditors to an equitable distribution of the assets of the debtor’s estate.”86 
                                                                                                                 
cf. In re Williams, 310 B.R. 442, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) (allowing trustee to reopen 
bankruptcy case to pursue omitted cause of action but “limit[ing] the trustee’s recovery to 
the amount of the unsecured claim . . . plus reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable 
expenses” because “the debtors [sic] failure to disclose [could not] be considered 
inadvertent”). 
The district court in Reed reached this result as well. See Reed v. City of Arlington, 765 
F. Supp. 2d 775, 778-79 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Former plaintiff . . . is estopped from collecting 
or receiving any money from the judgment against Defendant. The bankruptcy estate, 
represented by [the trustee], is not estopped from pursuing or collecting on this judgment 
against Defendant. Any funds collected from the judgment shall go to the bankruptcy estate 
for administration and distribution . . . . After distribution, any remaining funds shall be 
refunded to Defendant and not to former plaintiff . . . .”). 
 80. Reed, 650 F.3d at 573 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 574 (quoting Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 
197, 208 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 85. Id. at 574-75. 
 86. Id. at 574.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/2
2014]        RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL 473 
 
 
The court extensively quoted dicta from a Seventh Circuit opinion87 that 
aptly explained why judicial estoppel is inappropriate in such instances: 
[The debtor’s] nondisclosure in bankruptcy harmed his creditors 
by hiding assets from them. Using this same nondisclosure to 
wipe out his [tort] claim would complete the job by denying 
creditors even the right to seek some share of the recovery. . . . 
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and using it to land 
another blow on the victims of bankruptcy fraud is not an 
equitable application. Instead of vaporizing assets that could be 
used for the creditors’ benefit, district judges should discourage 
bankruptcy fraud by revoking the debtors’ discharges and 
referring them to the United States Attorney for potential 
criminal prosecution.88 
Because “[e]stopping the [t]rustee from pursuing the judgment against the 
City would thwart one of the core goals of the bankruptcy system—
obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors—by 
unnecessarily ‘vaporizing’ the assets effectively belonging to innocent 
creditors,” employing judicial estoppel in this case would effect an 
inequitable result.89 
The court also noted that a chapter 7 trustee who receives causes of 
action from a debtor’s estate is generally subject only to “pre-petition 
defenses . . . that would have been applicable to a debtor if no bankruptcy 
case had been filed.”90 Because the debtor’s nondisclosure constituted 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See Biesek v. Soo Line R.R. Co. 440 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2006). Due to the unusual 
procedural posture in Biesek, the Seventh Circuit did not have occasion to decide the judicial 
estoppel question. See id. at 411-14. Biesek has nonetheless been widely cited in judicial 
estoppel cases; it may therefore be properly considered a fundamental recent development in 
the area of consumer bankruptcy judicial estoppel decisions.  
 88. Reed, 650 F.3d at 576 (quoting Biesek, 440 F.3d at 413). 
 89. Id. (quoting Biesek, 440 F.3d at 413). 
 90. Id. at 575 (emphasis added) (quoting Riazuddin v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (In re 
Riazuddin), 363 B.R. 177, 188 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007)). “Generally speaking, a pre-petition 
cause of action is the property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in 
bankruptcy has standing to pursue it.” Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 
2003)). In a chapter 7 case, the chapter 7 trustee, “as the representative of the bankruptcy 
estate, is the proper party in interest, and is the only party with standing to prosecute causes 
of action belonging to the estate.” Id. (citing CODE § 323 (2000); Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292). 
“Once an asset becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, all rights held by the debtor in the 
asset are extinguished unless the asset is abandoned back to the debtor.” Id. (citing CODE § 
554). 
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“post-petition misconduct,” the trustee received the judgment “free and 
clear of a [judicial estoppel] defense that arose exclusively from [the 
debtor’s] post-petition actions.”91 
By reaching this result in Reed, the Fifth Circuit joins other appellate 
courts (including the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and the D.C. 
Circuit), district courts in numerous other circuits, and state courts that have 
either held or noted in dicta that a debtor’s misconduct should not judicially 
estop an innocent trustee from pursuing claims for the benefit of creditors.92 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Reed, 650 F.3d at 574-75 (emphasis added). 
 92. See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming 
district court decision that held, inter alia, that judicial estoppel “only applied to the extent 
that [the nondisclosed claim] was ‘prosecuted by [the debtor] on his own behalf,’” and did 
not apply to the trustee (citations omitted)); Parker, 365 F.3d at 1269 (“[B]ecause the party 
pursuing this case . . . is not [the debtor], but is instead the bankruptcy trustee—who did not 
make any inconsistent statements to the courts—we hold that judicial estoppel does not 
apply.”); Piper v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 3:11-554, 2011 WL 4565432, at *6-7 (M.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 29, 2011); Elkins v. Summit Cnty., Ohio, No. 5:06-CV-3004, 2008 WL 622038, at *6 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2008); Caldwell v. Malloy (In re Quarles), No. 06-CV-0137-CVE-SAJ, 
2007 WL 171913, at *5-7 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2007); Stramiello-Yednak v. Perl, No. Civ.A. 
05-517, 2006 WL 1158123, at *3-5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2006); Martin v. U.S. Bank, No. 
4:04CV01527AGF, 2005 WL 3107722, at *5-6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2005); Wood v. 
Household Fin. Corp., 341 B.R. 770, 773-74 (W.D. Wash. 2006). 
See also Stephenson v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 265, 271-72, 275 (6th Cir. 2012) (adopting 
Reed but holding that the debtor could not be judicially estopped regardless of whether the 
trustee intervened); Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1155 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2007) (noting in dicta that “[q]uite likely the district court’s application of judicial estoppel 
against the trustee was inappropriate, at least to the extent [the debtor’s] personal injury 
claims were necessary to satisfy his debts”); Harrah v. DSW Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907-
08 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (suggesting in dicta the court would adopt Reed); Gilman v. Target 
Corp., Civ. Action No. 09-cv-00669-ZLW-KMT, 2009 WL 4611474, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 
2009) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to claims by the Bankruptcy 
Trustee.”); Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 27 (E.D. Cal. 2006) 
(stating in dicta that “this court’s determination that judicial estoppel operates in this case to 
prevent Plaintiff from advancing her claims on her own behalf does not necessarily mean 
that an appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate may not advance claims belonging to 
Plaintiff for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate”); Ruffin v. Kinder Morgan Liquids 
Terminal, LLC, 2009 WL 17887, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 2, 2009); Arkison v. 
Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 P.3d 13, 14-16 (Wash. 2007).  
Cf. Javaid v. Allied-Barton Sec. Servs., No. CIV S-07-0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 
1925233, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008) (“Nor does the court consider whether plaintiff’s 
claims warrant the trustee’s reopening of plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding for the purpose 
of pursuing these claims on behalf of plaintiff’s creditors.” (citations omitted)), findings and 
recommendation adopted by No. CIV-S-070386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 2261297 (E.D. 
Cal. Jun. 2, 2008); In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 349 B.R. 181, 189 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) 
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The Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Reed signals a step away from an 
aggressively applied judicial estoppel doctrine, toward a more nuanced 
approach that takes the interests of third parties into account. Although 
many courts, to the dismay of several commentators, had previously applied 
judicial estoppel in a strict fashion, effectively depriving “creditors of any 
proceeds resulting from [the] undisclosed cause of action,’”93 Reed 
represents a movement toward the correct understanding that in bankruptcy 
law, “multiple parties’ claims create an interconnected web in which a loss 
or recovery by one reverberates throughout.”94 Thus, in the future, 
practitioners should expect courts to inquire into the effects of judicial 
estoppel on not only the debtor-plaintiff and the defendant in the 
subsequent lawsuit, but also the bankruptcy creditors. 
In light of Reed, courts are more likely to recognize that an innocent 
trustee should not be tainted by a debtor’s wrongdoing. Also, courts are less 
likely to dismiss a case on judicial estoppel grounds when doing so would 
reduce the ultimate recovery for creditors and allow a tortfeasor to escape 
                                                                                                                 
(holding that the nondisclosure of consumer debtor “[did] not apply to bar the claim as to 
[the debtor’s] trustee, who ha[d] taken no inconsistent position”).  
But see Marshal v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 605CV-1587ORL-18KRS, 2006 
WL 3756574, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2006) (applying judicial estoppel against chapter 7 
trustee when trustee moved to intervene only after defendant raised judicial estoppel defense 
against plaintiff). Note that the Middle District of Florida is in the Eleventh Circuit, and that 
this opinion came down after Parker was already decided. Marshal is therefore in tension 
with controlling precedent. 
Several commentators have looked favorably upon courts’ increasing unwillingness to 
visit the sins of the consumer debtor upon the innocent bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., Dugas, 
supra note 1, at 246-48; Jonathan M. Hiltz, Casenote, Killing Two Birds With One Stone – 
The Proper (Non)Application of Judicial Estoppel: Parker v. Wendy’s International, Inc., 
365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004), 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 401, 407-16 (2005). 
 93. Dugas, supra note 1, at 208; accord Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 7 (“Even if 
a . . . plaintiff might be estopped rightfully in certain cases from proceeding inconsistently, 
this still leaves creditors with unpaid debts. . . . [S]uccessful invocation of judicial estoppel 
creates a windfall for the defendant . . . .”); Brown, supra note 12, at 205-08, 215-16; Dugas, 
supra note 1, at 241-42 (“The majority analysis [that was] applied in the Third, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits [as of 2006] . . . applie[d] judicial estoppel to trump [the rights of] bankruptcy 
creditors . . . [and] le[ft] in place the original fraud committed by the failure to disclose 
assets.”); cf. Walker & Nickell, supra note 1, at 1127 (“If judicial estoppel is successfully 
invoked, the defendant will benefit by escaping accountability for his negligent or bad acts 
to the detriment of innocent third parties, including the debtor’s creditors and the debtor’s 
family.”). 
 94. See Dugas, supra note 1, at 207; see also Arkison, 160 P.3d at 14-16. 
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unscathed.95 On the other hand, where a debtor stands to benefit from her 
prior nondisclosure, a court will be more likely to find that judicial estoppel 
is warranted.96 
For example, in Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., a case decided post-Reed, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing, on the basis of judicial estoppel, a chapter 13 debtor’s civil 
rights action against his former employer that he failed to disclose in both 
his bankruptcy schedules and his chapter 13 plan.97 Because, under the 
terms of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, any potential recovery against the 
former employer “would go to [the debtor] to the exclusion of his 
creditors,”98 the court found the case sufficiently distinguishable from Reed 
to warrant the application of judicial estoppel.99 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See Taylor v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798-99 (E.D. 
Ark. 2003); see also Hiltz, supra note 92, at 411-13. But see Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 
16-17, 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he integrity of the bankruptcy process is sufficiently important 
that we should not hesitate to apply judicial estoppel even where it creates a windfall for an 
undeserving defendant.”); Sharp v. Oakwood United Hosps., 458 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473-74 
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to estop a litigant when “[a]pplication of judicial estoppel” to a 
wrongful death action “would most certainly harm [a litigant’s] ‘next of kin’”). 
 96. See Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that judicial estoppel is warranted where “debtors st[and] to benefit directly from pursuing 
their [nondisclosed] claim at the expense of their creditors,” but not where the debtors “stand 
to benefit only in the event that there is a surplus after all debts and fees have been paid”); 
Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 422 B.R. 612, 
635 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010); see also Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 266 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Reed and finding judicial estoppel warranted because “unlike the 
instant case where [the debtor] could potentially share in the gains from his lawsuit, only the 
creditors stood to benefit in Reed”). 
Some commentators have advocated:  
[A]llowing the trustee to intervene and carry out a lawsuit on behalf of the 
plaintiff, but . . . only allow a damages award to the extent necessary to repay 
the creditors. The nondisclosing debtor would only be precluded from receiving 
the residual amount of the award that is over and above the debt if he [or she] is 
found to have intentionally failed to disclose a cause of action. 
Hiltz, supra note 92, at 408; see also id. at 413-16. 
 97. Love, 677 F.3d at 260-61. 
 98. Id. at 264 (citing CODE §§ 554(c), 1329 (Supp. III 2009)). 
 99. The Love court wrote: 
[U]nlike the instant case where Love could potentially share in the gains from 
his lawsuit, only the creditors stood to benefit in Reed. . . . [T]he dissent 
correctly notes that the effect of judicial estoppel on creditors is a consideration 
that could discourage courts from applying the doctrine. We do not mean to 
diminish the weight that courts should give to creditors’ interests when 
determining whether judicial estoppel should apply. We merely hold that the 
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2. The Presumption of Advertent Nondisclosure 
As described above, although the judicial estoppel doctrine lacks a rigid 
set of requisite elements, courts frequently inquire whether the party’s 
assertion of an inconsistent position in a subsequent legal proceeding was 
inadvertent. The Fifth Circuit, in a decision prior to Love entitled Browning 
Manufacturing v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), held that “in 
considering judicial estoppel for bankruptcy cases, the debtor’s failure to 
satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is ‘inadvertent’ only when, in general, 
the debtor either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no 
motive for their concealment.”100  
Love is notable because it built on Coastal Plains by firmly establishing 
a strong presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that a debtor’s nondisclosure 
in bankruptcy will be deemed advertent, which weighs heavily in favor of 
judicially estopping that debtor.101 Love approvingly quoted a decision from 
the Southern District of Mississippi, stating that “the motivation sub-
element” of the Coastal Plains inadvertence analysis “is almost always met 
if a debtor fails to disclose a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy 
court. Motivation in this context is self-evident because of potential 
financial benefit resulting from the nondisclosure.”102 Thus, 
notwithstanding the summary judgment procedural posture of Love,103 once 
the debtor’s former employer “set forth a motivation for [the debtor] to 
keep his claims concealed—the prospect that [he] could keep any recovery 
for himself,” “it fell to [the debtor] to show that the omission of his claims 
from his schedule of assets was inadvertent.”104 On appeal, the debtor failed 
to mention inadvertence in his response to his former employer’s motion 
                                                                                                                 
district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to Love’s 
claims . . . . 
Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 
 100. 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Jethroe v. Omnova 
Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600-01 (5th Cir. 2005). Where a debtor “could not have 
foreseen” the claims at issue arising, judicial estoppel is unwarranted. Dorbeck v. Sykora, 
No. 09-cv-14646, 2010 WL 3245327, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2010). The court in 
Dorbeck did apply judicial estoppel, but it did so on other grounds. Id. at *3. 
 101. See Love, 677 F.3d at 262. 
 102. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Thompson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No. 
3:04CV837-WHB-JCS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48409, at *12-13 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2006) 
(citation omitted)). 
 103. The dissent in Love accused the majority of “improperly plac[ing] the summary 
judgment burden of th[e] affirmative defense [of judicial estoppel] on [the debtor].” Id. at 
266 (Haynes, J., dissenting). For the majority’s response to the dissent, see id. at 263-66. 
 104. Id. at 262 (citing Jethroe, 412 F.3d at 600-01). 
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for summary judgment.105 Consequently, the court ruled that the debtor 
failed to rebut the presumption, and therefore the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment to the employer on 
judicial estoppel grounds.106 
A bankruptcy court aptly described the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Love—
and the presumption of advertence it creates—as follows: 
In Love, the Fifth Circuit articulated a very high standard for any 
debtor to show that he had no motive to conceal. . . . [I]t will 
almost always be the case that nondisclosure automatically 
equates to an affirmative motive to conceal. 
 The Fifth Circuit left the door only slightly open for a debtor 
to overcome this high hurdle. With its use of the words “almost 
always,” the Fifth Circuit left open the possibility that certain 
circumstances could exist where nondisclosure does not 
automatically constitute motive; however, the Fifth Circuit did 
not elaborate on these circumstances.107 
Thus, Love rendered the judicial estoppel doctrine in the Fifth Circuit not 
only stricter, but also more uncertain regarding how a debtor may escape 
the application of judicial estoppel. 
Several other circuits are in accord with the results reached by the Fifth 
Circuit in Love and Coastal Plains.108 In Eastman v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co.,109 a case factually analogous to Love in all pertinent respects,110 the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 263. Interestingly, the debtor was represented by counsel in both his civil 
rights action and chapter 13 case but chose to appear pro se on appeal. Id. at 261 n.1, 263. 
 106. Id. at 263.  
 107. In re Watts, No. 09-35864, 2012 WL 3400820, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 
2012) (emphasis added); cf. Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 12 (“An analysis under 
Coastal Plains inevitably leads to the conclusion that all debtors have a motive for 
concealment.”). 
 108. Contra Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1374, 1379 (arguing that federal courts “allow[] for 
flexible application of judicial estoppel in unusual circumstances” and “that the standards 
applied are not to be enforced mechanistically”). In actuality, it appears that many courts are 
moving toward reining in flexibility and discretion by presuming advertence on the part of 
nondisclosing consumer debtors, although counterexamples surely exist. 
 109. 493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 110. Although the plaintiff in Eastman, unlike the plaintiff in Love, filed bankruptcy 
under chapter 7 rather than chapter 13, both he and the plaintiff in Love were judicially 
estopped from bringing a tort action against their respective former employers due to their 
failure to disclose their claims. Compare id., 493 F.3d at 1153-55, with Love, 677 F.3d at 
260-61.  
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Tenth Circuit noted that although “it may be appropriate to resist 
application of judicial estoppel when a party’s prior position was based on 
inadvertence or mistake,” courts properly “infer deliberate manipulation” in 
cases “[w]here a debtor has both knowledge of the claims and a motive to 
conceal them.”111 The court, applying this presumption of advertence, 
found that “the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence” 
was that the debtor “knew of his pending lawsuit and simply did not 
disclose it to the bankruptcy court.”112 Because the debtor “had been 
seriously injured in an auto accident and sued his employer along with eight 
other co-defendants for thousands of dollars,”113 the Eastman court found it 
“impossible to believe that such a sizable claim . . . could be overlooked 
when [the debtor] was filling in the bankruptcy schedules.”114  
The Eleventh Circuit has likewise repeatedly affirmed that nondisclosure 
will be presumed to be advertent when the debtor has both knowledge of 
the claims and a motive to conceal them.115 As one commentator explains  
                                                                                                                 
Courts have held that judicial estoppel applies equally in chapter 7 and chapter 13 for the 
most part. See, e.g., De Leon v. Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Javaid v. Allied-Barton Sec. Servs., No. CIV S-07-0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 1925233, 
at *4 n.8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008), report and recommendation adopted by No. CIV-S-07-
0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 2261297 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2008); Biggs v. AM Gen., LLC, 
No. 3:07-CV-28 JVB, 2008 WL 1957864, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ind. May 1, 2008) (citing Becker 
v. Verizon N., Inc., 2007 WL 1224039, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007)). But see Snowden v. 
Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (noting that 
the result reached in Parker (and, by analogy, Reed) is inapplicable to chapter 13 because 
“[i]n Chapter 7 cases, all pre-petition causes of action . . . generally must be prosecuted by 
the trustee,” whereas “a chapter 13 debtor maintains control over all assets . . . and therefore 
has standing to bring suit in his own right” (citation omitted)). 
Whether judicial estoppel applies equally in chapter 11 cases is another matter. See 
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002) (suggesting in dicta that the answer is 
no). See also Hansford v. Bank of Am., Civ. Action No. 07-4716, 2008 WL 4078460, at *10 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (distinguishing chapter 11 from chapter 13 cases for judicial 
estoppel purposes). 
 111. Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1157 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 753 
(2001)). 
 112. Id. at 1159. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (quoting Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 115. See Muse v. Accord Human Res., Inc., 129 F. App’x 487, 488 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In 
the context of a bankruptcy case, judicial estoppel bars a plaintiff from asserting claims 
previously undisclosed to the bankruptcy court where the plaintiff both knew about the 
claims and had a motive to conceal them from the bankruptcy court.”); Barger v. City of 
Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2003); De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1291; 
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[B]y inferring bad intent by any debtor who had knowledge of 
his claim and who stood to benefit financially by omitting it, the 
Eleventh Circuit discourages an inquiry into the debtor’s actual 
motives. It is unclear under the Eleventh Circuit standard when, 
if ever, the omission can be deemed inadvertent.116  
Note, however, that several district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have 
resisted and attempted to limit these appellate decisions.117 
 Additionally, district courts within the Second Circuit have adopted the 
presumption of advertence.118 The Seventh Circuit also appears to have 
                                                                                                                 
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Browning 
Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains), 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
Note, however, that “the Eleventh Circuit standard for showing inadvertence appears less 
demanding than the standard applied in the Fifth Circuit.” Guerra v. Lehman Commercial 
Paper, Inc., Civ. Action No. H-06-1444, 2007 WL 419517, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2007). 
This statement was made before the Fifth Circuit decided Love; thus, any disconnect 
between the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits that existed at the time Guerra was decided is now 
even more pronounced. 
 116. Walker & Nickell, supra note 1, at 1128. 
 117. Intriguingly, some district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted 
Burnes and its progeny to establish only a “permissive rather than mandatory” presumption 
of advertence that does not “require a court to infer an intent to mislead the bankruptcy court 
when . . . the plaintiff was aware of the claims and had a motive to mislead the bankruptcy 
court.” Snowden v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (M.D. Ala. 
2006). This reading of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent strikes us as strained. For the 
district court’s response to the argument that the rejection of the presumption of advertence 
is inconsistent with binding appellate court precedent, see id. at 1373 n.9.  
Similarly, in Thompson v. Quarles, 392 B.R. 517 (S.D. Ga. 2008), the court stated: 
While [intent to deceive] can be inferred from the circumstances, such as where 
a debtor stands to gain financially from failing to disclose a cause of action, 
Defendants have pointed to no authority suggesting that such an inference must 
be drawn in any particular case, such as this one, and the Court has uncovered 
none. 
Id. at 527. It is puzzling that neither the court nor the defendants in Thompson located 
Eastman, Muse, Jethroe, or Coastal Plains in their research; all of those cases strongly 
suggest that a powerful presumption of advertence (albeit one that is possible to rebut) 
exists, and all of those cases had been decided before Thompson in 2008. To be sure, some 
of those cases are from other circuits and thus are merely persuasive authority. Moreover, 
those that were from the Eleventh Circuit were unpublished and therefore lacked 
precedential effect. Nevertheless, the cases did exist at the time, and they do appear to 
suggest that the inference of advertence is mandatory.  
 118. “[E]ven where the omission in a bankruptcy filing was based on mistake or 
ignorance, judicial estoppel should apply. . . Even if mistake were sufficient reason to 
decline to apply judicial estoppel, it only exists where the party lacked knowledge of the 
claim or had no motive for concealment.” Galin v. United States, No. 08-CV-
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adopted a doctrine approximating a presumption of advertence, although 
the precise contours are presently unclear; some courts show an increasing 
willingness to infer advertence, although there remains room for inquiry 
into a debtor’s actual intent.119 The same may be said of the Ninth 
Circuit.120 Likewise, though the First Circuit has explicitly left open the 
                                                                                                                 
2508(JFB)(ETB), 2008 WL 5378387, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted); cf. Galin v. IRS, 563 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340-41 (D. Conn. 2008) (applying 
judicial estoppel against debtor even where debtor had no knowledge of her claims and 
omitted them solely on the basis of a good faith mistake). 
 119. The Seventh Circuit has given some guidance: 
It is impossible to believe that such a sizable claim―one central to her daily 
activities at work―could have been overlooked when [the debtor] was filling 
in the bankruptcy schedules. And if [the debtor] were really making an honest 
attempt to pay her debts, then as soon as she realized that it had been omitted, 
she would have filed amended schedules and moved to reopen the bankruptcy, 
so that the creditors could benefit from any recovery. [The debtor] never did 
that; she wants every penny of the judgment for herself.  
Cannon-Stokes, 453 F.3d at 448-49 (first emphasis added); see also Biggs v. AM Gen., LLC, 
No. 3:07-CV-28 JVB, 2008 WL 1957864, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 1, 2008) (“Inadvertence or 
mistake exists where (1) the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the undisclosed claim or (2) had 
no motive to conceal the claim.” (citing Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 
1157 (10th Cir. 2007))). 
But see Swearingen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 456 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 
2006) (appearing to require affirmative showing of intent to deceive the court); In re FV 
Steel and Wire Co., 349 B.R. 181, 188-89 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (same); Beiner & 
Chapman, supra note 1, at 20 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s judicial estoppel standard as 
“more plaintiff-friendly”). Note also that the Seventh Circuit has stated that judicial estoppel 
should be “applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truthseeking function of the 
court.” Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 265 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Teledyne 
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (6th Cir. 1990)).  
 120. “Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts 
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy, but 
fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a 
contingent asset.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784-86 (9th Cir. 
2001) (emphasis added) (citing Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 
557 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
See also Javaid v. Allied-Barton Sec. Servs., No. CIV S-07-0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 
WL 1925233, at *10 (Apr. 30, 2008) (noting that a subjective intent to mislead is not a 
prerequisite to applying judicial estoppel), findings and recommendation adopted by No. 
CIV-S-07-0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 2261297 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2008); Rose v. Beverly 
Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 26-27 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (same). 
But see Kinnee v. Shack, Inc., Civ. No. 07-1463-AC, 2008 WL 4899204, at *5 (D. Or. 
Nov. 12, 2008); Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 WL 
109065, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008) (holding that even though Hamilton “did not discuss or 
analyze the debtor’s intent . . . one can infer from Hamilton that intent was a factor in that 
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question of whether there is a presumption of advertence, it has also 
signaled that it might favor such a presumption.121 Some state courts have 
very clearly adopted a strong (albeit rebuttable) presumption of advertence 
as well.122 
With respect to judicial estoppel against consumer debtors, even 
historically lenient circuits have adopted a presumption of inadvertence (or 
at least something approximating one) in recent years. A comparison 
between the Third Circuit’s decision in Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-
Midwest Lumber Co.,123 and its subsequent decision in Krystal Cadillac-
Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,124 is illustrative. 
Although both of these cases are corporate rather than consumer cases, both 
are frequently cited in consumer bankruptcy opinions.125 In Ryan 
Operations, the Third Circuit explicitly refused to adopt a presumption of 
advertence.126 The court “reject[ed] [the] argument that intent may be 
inferred for purposes of judicial estoppel solely from nondisclosure 
notwithstanding the affirmative disclosure requirement of the [Code].”127 
Even though the debtor in Ryan Operations undeniably “violated these 
statutory duties of full disclosure,”128 the court held that judicial estoppel 
                                                                                                                 
decision”); Moreno v. Autozone, Inc., No. C05-04432 MJJ, 2007 WL 1063433, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 9, 2007) (suggesting in dicta that judicial estoppel may be inappropriate where 
“the value of [the undisclosed] claims is uncertain, and the effect, if any, that disclosure 
would have had on the course of the bankruptcy proceedings is purely speculative”); Valdez 
v. JDR LLC, No. CV 04-1620-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2038456, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. July 20, 
2006) (interpreting Hamilton to require an affirmative showing of intent before judicial 
estoppel is triggered).  
 121. See Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 20, 20 nn.7-8 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 122. For example, one Indiana court wrote: 
An inference of bad faith arises when the party asserting judicial estoppel 
demonstrates that a debtor-plaintiff has knowledge of an unscheduled claim and 
motive for concealment in the face of a duty to disclose. If the party asserting 
judicial estoppel establishes knowledge of a claim and motive for concealment, 
the debtor-plaintiff then has the burden of coming forth with evidence 
indicating that the nondisclosure was made in good faith. 
Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E.2d 1218, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Morgan Cnty. Hosp. 
v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 123. 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 124. 337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 125. See, e.g., Castillo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of E. Great Lakes, Civ. Action No. 06-
183, 2006 WL 1410045, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2006). 
 126. Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 364-65. 
 127. Id. at 365. 
 128. Id. at 362. 
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could not be applied absent a finding of “bad faith” or “intentional 
wrongdoing.”129 The court explained:  
[P]olicy considerations militate against adopting a rule that the 
requisite intent for judicial estoppel can be inferred from the 
mere fact of nondisclosure in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such a 
rule would unduly expand the reach of judicial estoppel in post-
bankruptcy proceedings and would inevitably result in the 
preclusion of viable claims . . . .130 
On the other hand, in Krystal, the Third Circuit held that “a rebuttable 
inference of bad faith arises when averments in the pleadings demonstrate 
both knowledge of a claim and a motive to conceal that claim in the face of 
an affirmative duty to disclose,”131 and that the debtor did indeed have the 
requisite motive to conceal.132 Many, although not all, district courts in the 
Third Circuit appear more inclined to follow Krystal than Ryan 
Operations.133 
Not all courts have adopted a strong presumption of advertence, 
however. Courts in the Eighth Circuit134 and the Fourth Circuit135 have not 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id.; accord Hansford v. Bank of Am., Civ. Action No. 07-4716, 2008 WL 4078460, 
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (holding that judicial estoppel requires the party to be 
estopped to “have behaved in a manner that is somehow culpable”). 
 130. Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 364. 
 131. Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 
321 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey 
Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416-18 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 132. Id. at 323-24. 
 133. See, e.g., DePasquale v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Civ. No. 10–6828 
(WJM–MF), 2011 WL 3703110, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2011); Clark v. Strober-Haddonfield 
Grp. Inc., Civ. No. 07-910 (RBK), 2008 WL 2945972, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (“[A]s a 
person seeking to discharge his debts in bankruptcy, he had a motive to conceal potential 
assets to prevent them from being available for distribution to creditors. Because Plaintiff 
knew about his discrimination claim and had a motive to conceal it from his creditors, bad 
faith may be inferred.” (emphasis added) (citing Krystal, 337 F.3d at 321, 323)). But see 
Hansford, 2008 WL 4078460, at *8 n.3 (stating that “the cases from other jurisdictions” that 
stand “for the proposition that a debtor’s failure to list a claim in the mandatory bankruptcy 
filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed are inapposite” in the 
Third Circuit (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re 
Cotter), Bankr. No. 08-12504, Adversary No. 11-01619, 2011 WL 5900811 at *6-8 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011). 
 134. See Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006); Taylor v. 
Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 799 (E.D. Ark. 2003) (“The mere 
failure to list the EEOC charge in the bankruptcy proceeding will not support a finding of 
intent.”). 
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accepted the presumption of advertence. It is unclear whether the Sixth 
Circuit has accepted the presumption; the law in that circuit appears to be in 
a state of flux.136 The D.C. Circuit has addressed judicial estoppel in 
                                                                                                                 
 135. The Fourth Circuit appears to require an affirmative showing of bad faith to trigger 
judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 2007)), abrogated on other grounds 
by Vance v. Ball State Univ. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 136. Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002), favorably cited the restrictive 
definition of inadvertence established in In re Coastal Plains, Inc., but ultimately opted not 
to apply judicial estoppel in part because the omission at issue there was “as consistent with 
inadvertence as it is with an affirmative assertion.” Id. at 775 (emphasis added). Such 
language is, by definition, at odds with a presumption of advertence. “[T]he [Browning] 
Court noted that it had not decided whether bad faith or an attempt to mislead the court were 
prerequisites for the application of judicial estoppel, but did hold that it was inappropriate 
where the failure to disclose was due to mistake or inadvertence.” Wallace v. Johnston Coca-
Cola Bottling Grp., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-875, 2007 WL 927929, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 
2007) (citing Browning, 283 F.3d at 776). In any event, because the court held that the 
claims at issue were barred on res judicata grounds, the judicial estoppel analysis in 
Browning is dicta. See Browning, 283 F.3d at 771-75. 
Eubanks v. CBSK Financial Group, Inc., 385 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2004), appears to require 
some degree of “fraudulent intentions toward the court” before judicial estoppel can be 
applied, which would preclude a presumption of advertence. Id. at 899. However, there 
appears to be some tension between the judges regarding how much weight to give the 
language in Coastal Plains that suggests advertence should be presumed when the debtor 
stands to enjoy a windfall from nondisclosure. Compare id. at 898 (Clay, J., for the court), 
with id. at 899-900 (McCalla, J., dissenting). 
Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. App’x 420 (6th Cir. 2005), an unpublished opinion, 
holds that a court may, but need not, presume advertence when the movant demonstrates 
both knowledge and motive to conceal, and reaffirms the importance of bad faith to the 
judicial estoppel inquiry. Id. at 426-27. However, in Jackson v. Communicare Health 
Services, No. 1:06 CV 1948, 2009 WL 455410 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2009), the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio characterized Sixth Circuit precedent as 
holding “that the only basis for finding judicial estoppel to be inappropriate in such a context 
would be where (1) the debtor lacks knowledge of the factual basis of the undisclosed claim 
or (2) the debtor has no motive for concealment.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2010), appears to 
require some showing of bad faith before judicial estoppel may be applied, but appears to 
place the burden of showing an absence of bad faith on the plaintiff. Id. at 476-87; accord 
Harrah v. DSW Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citing White, 617 F.3d at 
479). With respect to satisfying this burden, “the timing of correction efforts is ‘significant,’ 
with affirmative efforts that pre-date a ‘judicial estoppel’ motion from the defendant being 
‘more important’ than efforts generated in response to a dispositive motion.” Id. (quoting 
White, 617 F.3d at 480). 
Stephenson v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit’s most recent 
statement on judicial estoppel in the consumer bankruptcy context, ultimately held that 
judicial estoppel was inapplicable because “the bankruptcy trustee was told of [the 
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consumer bankruptcy cases, but it has not opined on the propriety of a 
presumption of advertence one way or another.137 
a) Takeaways for Practitioners 
Although courts are moving away from an application of the judicial 
estoppel doctrine that could operate to the detriment of trustees and 
creditors, the doctrine nevertheless remains strict as a general matter in 
several circuits. Many courts will not hesitate to estop a debtor who stands 
to directly benefit from her nondisclosures in bankruptcy. Accordingly, 
they will impute the intent not to disclose to any debtor with (1) knowledge 
of her claims and (2) the potential to benefit from their nondisclosure.138 
Courts are “unsympathetic to what appear to be honest mistakes by 
debtors.”139  
This imposes important duties on the bankruptcy practitioner. The 
practitioner must stress to the client not only that the client has a continuing 
duty to disclose any and all pending and potential lawsuits, but also that the 
court will likely deem advertent even an unthinking failure to disclose a 
cause of action. 
                                                                                                                 
nondisclosed] lawsuit long before Defendants sought summary judgment on judicial 
estoppel grounds,” but included language that the debtor-plaintiff “presumably had a motive 
to conceal the claims: ‘wanting to keep any settlement or judgment to himself.’” Id. at 274. 
This suggests that motive to conceal will be presumed in bankruptcy. 
As the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan stated in Riddle 
v. Chase Home Finance, No. 09-11182, 2010 WL 3504020 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2010), 
“Leniency has not been the watchword that characterizes the Sixth Circuit’s treatment of 
judicial estoppel claims in the bankruptcy context. . . . White represents a harsh application 
of the judicial estoppel doctrine . . . .” Id. at *3-*4 (emphasis added). Some district courts in 
the Sixth Circuit have expressly held that “motive to conceal assets is always present in a 
Chapter 13 case, because it is ‘always in a Chapter 13 petitioner’s interest to minimize 
income and assets.’” Harrah, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (quoting Lewis, 141 F. App’x at 426). 
This would imply a presumption of advertence analogous to Love in chapter 13 cases. See 
also Jackson, 2009 WL 455410, at *4 (“Permitting [the debtor] to avoid the consequences of 
judicial estoppel here on the grounds of mere oversight, no matter the cause, would unfairly 
benefit her . . . .” (emphasis added)); Wallace, 2007 WL 927929, at *3 (appearing to 
presume motive to conceal). 
 137. See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 799-800 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 138. See, e.g., Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2012); Eastman v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2007); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 
Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2003). See also supra Part I.B.2. 
 139. Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 12. 
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Conversely, even though judicial estoppel is purportedly “not intended as 
an offensive weapon available to defeat plaintiffs’ claims,”140 decisions like 
Love render judicial estoppel an incredibly powerful tool in the hands of 
alleged tortfeasors.141 Counsel opposing an individual consumer plaintiff 
would be wise to investigate whether the plaintiff was previously or 
presently in bankruptcy, and if so whether the plaintiff-debtor had disclosed 
the lawsuit at issue in its bankruptcy filings.142 If the plaintiff-debtor did 
not, and if she (rather than her creditors) stood to benefit from that 
nondisclosure, it is likely that the defendant could successfully dismiss the 
case on judicial estoppel grounds. 
That said, judicial estoppel is no panacea for defendants. For instance, 
though judicial estoppel will frequently bar plaintiffs “from pursuing claims 
for monetary damages,” some courts have held that “the doctrine d[oes] not 
prohibit [the plaintiff] from pursuing claims which add no monetary value 
to the bankruptcy estate,” such as claims for reinstatement or other 
injunctive relief.143 However, other courts disagree.144 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Snowden v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1375 (M.D. Ala. 
2006); accord Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (“Judicial estoppel is not a sword to be wielded by adversaries unless such tactics 
are necessary to ‘secure substantial equity.’”) (quoting Gleason v. United States, 458 F.2d 
171, 175 (3d Cir. 1972)). 
 141. See Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]he beauty of judicial estoppel from 
an employer’s perspective is that it allows the employer to win an employment 
discrimination case before the court reaches the merits of the claim.”). Professors Beiner and 
Chapman emphatically do not consider this “beauty” of judicial estoppel a good thing. See 
id. at 6-7. 
 142. See Zachary D. Fasman, Taking the Plaintiff’s Deposition: The Defense Viewpoint, 
712 PLI/LIT 513, 521 (2004) (“Do a complete file search [on the plaintiff] . . . to obtain 
all . . . bankruptcy filings . . . [or] other litigation filed, etc. Find out anything and everything 
about the plaintiff that may be relevant to the case.”); see also Moses, 606 F.3d at 793-94. 
 143. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297 (citing Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 
1288-89 (11th Cir. 2002)); accord Matthews v. Potter, 316 F. App’x 518, 523-24 (7th Cir. 
2009); Clark v. Strober-Haddonfield Grp. Inc., Civ. No. 07-910 (RBK), 2008 WL 2945972, 
at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008); see also Javaid v. Allied-Barton Sec. Servs., No. CIV S-07-
0386 FCD GGH PS, 2008 WL 1925233, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008) (agreeing in dicta), 
report and recommendation adopted by 2008 WL 2261297 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 2, 2008). 
The court in Castillo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Eastern Great Lakes, Civ. Action No. 
06-183, 2006 WL 1410045 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2006), adopted an interesting variant to this 
approach, whereby the court held that the debtor was not permitted to pursue compensatory 
or punitive damages, but was permitted to “purse [sic] equitable relief, and . . . also seek 
backpay and/or frontpay, if appropriate.” Id. at *4-*5. In other words, it may be appropriate 
to allow judicially estopped debtors to pursue some but not all types of monetary damages, 
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b) Of Theory and Policy 
Courts have largely adopted the presumption of advertence,145 and 
practitioners are accordingly advised to tread lightly. But does the 
presumption of advertence make sense as a matter of theory or policy? We 
conclude it does not. This article therefore advises courts to reconsider the 
presumption’s propriety. 
For one, judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine,146 and a presumption 
is by definition inconsistent with notions of equity.147 As commentators 
have noted, equitable considerations undergird bankruptcy law.148 “[I]t is 
the historic purpose of equity to ‘secur[e] complete justice,’”149 and 
fulfilling this purpose requires that the court have the freedom to weigh the 
equities in order to reach an independent decision about what justice 
requires in any given case.150 If “equity means the power to . . . mitigate the 
                                                                                                                 
rather than simply permit the plaintiff to seek injunctive relief but bar all claims for 
monetary relief. 
 144. See Piper v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 3:11-554, 2011 WL 4565432, at *7 n.6 (M.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 29, 2011) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit would not allow a judicially estopped 
plaintiff . . . who asserted both monetary and equitable claims at the onset of litigation, to 
proceed with her equitable claims.”). 
 145. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 146. E.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (citing Russell v. Rolfs, 
893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)); Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1354. 
 147. To be sure, a presumption is also by definition rebuttable; presumptions may be 
trumped by sufficiently compelling circumstances and therefore may still be consistent with 
equitable principles. The point is that, by placing a thumb firmly on the scale in favor of 
estopping litigants, judges—especially lower court judges—are restricted from arriving at 
the result they would otherwise be inclined to reach. 
 148. See, e.g., Hiltz, supra note 92, at 410-11 (citing Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy 
Court Is a Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 276 (1999)). 
 149. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Brown v. 
Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)). 
 150. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The 
Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 609 (1997) (“[E]quity means the 
power to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case, ‘individualized justice,’ 
in effect.”); see also New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 (“In this case, we simply observe that 
the factors above firmly tip the balance of equities . . . .” (emphasis added)). There are 
certainly valid concerns that judges, drunk with the intoxicating power of discretion, may 
wield equitable power inconsistently, capriciously, tyrannously, or with bias.  
However, equity jurisprudence is not an open-ended system of boundless 
discretion vested in a single judge. . . . [E]quity is not a roving commission that 
empowers a judge to dispense his or her own brand of justice in a particular 
case as he or she sees fit. . . . While one of the hallmarks of equity is its 
flexibility, it is a flexibility that is exercised against a backdrop of specific 
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rigidity of strict legal rules,”151 then there is supreme irony in straitjacketing 
equity by means of a rigid, strict legal rule like the presumption of 
advertence.152 
The presumption of advertence is not only inconsistent with principles of 
equity. It is also inconsistent with binding Supreme Court precedent. To 
reiterate, the Supreme Court emphasized in New Hampshire that “judicial 
estoppel ‘is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.’”153 
The Court went on to state that judicial estoppel is “probably not reducible 
to any general formulation of principle”154 and lacks “inflexible 
prerequisites or an exhaustive formula.”155 The presumption of advertence 
amounts to exactly the sort of discretion-restricting exhaustive formula that 
the Supreme Court sought to avoid. 
Furthermore, recall that the stated purpose of judicial estoppel is not to 
protect the parties, but rather to “prevent ‘improper use of judicial 
machinery.’”156 If advertence is presumed from the bare facts of knowledge 
and motivation, then the court has no occasion to evaluate whether the 
litigant to be estopped has truly played “fast and loose” with the judicial 
system.157 In other words, without earnestly examining whether or not the 
nondisclosure was truly advertent, the court cannot gauge the extent to 
which the judicial system’s integrity has been tarnished. Therefore, the 
presumption of advertence is not only inconsistent with equity and binding 
precedent; it is also inconsistent with the very purpose of judicial estoppel 
itself. 
In many ways, the presumption of advertence may be viewed as another 
skirmish in the ever-present “rules versus standards” war that echoes 
throughout numerous areas of the law.158 Should judicial estoppel be 
governed by a rule promulgated ex ante, which “entail[s] an advance 
determination of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues 
                                                                                                                 
rules . . . . 
Kennedy, supra, at 609-10. 
 151. Kennedy, supra note 150, at 609. 
 152. See infra notes 158-164 and accompanying text. 
 153. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
 154. Id. (citations omitted). 
 155. Id. at 751. 
 156. Id. at 750 (quoting Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). See 
also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., Scarano v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953). 
 158. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
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for the adjudicator?”159 Or should it be governed by an ex post standard, 
which “leav[es] both specification of what conduct is permissible and 
factual issues for the adjudicator?”160 By adopting the presumption of 
advertence, courts have eschewed an ex post, open-ended standard for an ex 
ante rule with formal-logic-style rigidity:161 if knowledge and motivation, 
then advertent. Although rules have definite advantages in other contexts,162 
this article contends that they are inappropriate in the judicial estoppel 
context. This is because (1) the underlying facts, (2) the debtor’s relative 
culpability and duplicitousness, (3) and the threat to the integrity of the 
judiciary vary between cases. Increased accuracy may therefore be gained 
from particularized judgments.163 Put differently, because judicial estoppel 
cases are relatively heterogenous, the presumption of advertence is likely to 
be markedly overinclusive; more debtors will be estopped than would occur 
under a more discretionary inquiry.164 
To be sure, courts that have adopted the presumption of advertence insist 
that the presumption is rebuttable under certain circumstances. However, 
these circumstances remain largely undefined. In the absence of a clear 
signal regarding how the presumption may be rebutted, the presumption 
remains a rigid, inflexible rule, and it is subject to the criticisms discussed 
above. 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 560. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 559-62. 
 162. See id. at 563-65. In particular, when choosing between whether to promulgate a 
rule or a standard to govern behavior, “the frequency of individual behavior and of 
adjudication is of central importance.” Id. at 563. “If there will be many enforcement 
actions, the added cost from having resolved the issue on a wholesale basis at the 
promulgation stage [by promulgating a rule] will be outweighed by the benefit of having 
avoided additional costs repeatedly incurred in giving content to a standard on a retail basis.” 
Id. Although debtors are frequently caught concealing assets, and it is impossible to tell 
exactly how often debtors fail to disclose causes of action and other assets on their 
schedules, when one considers the sheer number of consumer bankruptcy cases pursued to 
completion without incident each year, judicial estoppel determinations and nondisclosures 
are, in the grand scheme of things, relatively infrequent. This further supports the argument 
that a standard, not a rule, should govern judicial estoppel determinations. 
 163. Contra Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 228-29 (2006) 
(discussing a different context in administrative law in which a rule is preferable to a 
standard). 
 164. See Kaplow, supra note 158, at 565 (noting that although rules are not necessarily 
over and under inclusive relative to standards because both rules and standards can be either 
simple or complex, a simple rule is more likely to be over- and under-inclusive than a 
complex standard). 
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For these reasons, this article urges judges to think twice before applying 
the presumption of advertence. To be clear, this article does not argue that 
nondisclosing debtors should go unpunished; nor does it argue that judicial 
estoppel should be severely curtailed.165 The article does not dispute that 
the Code—and the functioning of the bankruptcy system in general—
depend on full disclosure by debtors,166 or that disincentives to 
nondisclosure are necessary. Indeed, this is not even to say that courts can 
never infer advertence from the circumstantial evidence of knowledge plus 
motivation. This article merely argues that courts, before applying judicial 
estoppel, should make an independent determination that weighs the 
particular facts, the balance of equities, and the risk of harm to judicial 
integrity in each case, instead of automatically applying a rigid, virtually 
irrebuttable presumption. Judicial estoppel should remain a viable defense, 
but it should also remain a flexible, discretionary doctrine employed only 
when appropriate. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that courts have tools other than judicial 
estoppel to deter dissembling debtors and to mitigate nondisclosure’s 
negative consequences. These include revocation of discharge,167 the 
reopening of the bankruptcy case under Code § 350(b),168 criminal penalties 
under 18 U.S.C. § 152,169 and others.170 Thus, courts have a wide variety of 
alternatives at their disposal, some more lenient than judicial estoppel, some 
harsher. Rather than applying judicial estoppel mechanically and 
unthinkingly, courts should carefully decide which remedy would best 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Contra Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 2 (“Judicial estoppel, an old and 
arguably outdated court-created procedural tool, relegates parts of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and [the Code] to the status of guidelines rather than actual rules. Because of 
judicial estoppel, employers are getting away with acts of discrimination, creditors are 
missing out on opportunities to be repaid, and employment discrimination victims are losing 
their day in court.”). 
 166. E.g., Fokkena v. Tripp (In re Tripp), 224 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998). 
 167. Dugas, supra note 1, at 251 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)). 
 168. E.g., Christopher W. Frost, Applying Judicial Estoppel to Protect the Interests of 
Creditors, BANKR. L. LETTER, Oct. 2010, 5, available at 30 NO. 10 BLL 2 (Westlaw). Code 
§ 350(b) provides that “[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed 
to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.” CODE § 350(b) (2012). 
 169. Dugas, supra note 1, at 251 (citing Greenheart Durawoods, Inc. v. PHF Int’l Corp., 
No. 91 Civ. 3731, 1994 WL 652434, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 152 
(2012) provides for fines and imprisonment for concealment of assets and false oaths and 
claims in bankruptcy. 
 170. See Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 57-59 (describing “a procedural alternative 
to the use of judicial estoppel” (citing Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 
2004))). 
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effectuate the purposes and policies embodied by the Code and other 
applicable law.171 “As courts have announced, but not adequately applied, 
judicial estoppel should not be employed unless it is ‘tailored to address the 
harm identified’ and ‘no lesser sanction would adequately remedy the 
damage done by the litigant’s misconduct.’”172 
3. A Debtor’s Failure to Immediately Amend a Newly Discovered Cause 
of Action May Not Necessarily Trigger Judicial Estoppel 
So far this article has discussed cases in which a consumer debtor failed 
to disclose a preexisting cause of action on her bankruptcy schedules. 
Where a cause of action arises after the debtor has already filed her 
schedules, however, some courts approach the judicial estoppel calculus 
differently. 
a) Delay in Amending Schedules 
One court has held that “a plaintiff who fails to amend her bankruptcy 
schedules to include her FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938] claims 
within four months of learning of the claims’ existence” is “not barred by 
judicial estoppel” from pursuing those claims.173 Where, however, the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See Dugas, supra note 1, at 252. 
 172. Id. at 251 (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 173. Snowden v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (M.D. Ala. 
2006) (emphasis added). Because the debtor’s claims against her employer “did not exist 
when she filed bankruptcy documents under oath,” and because the debtor “did not file any 
documents with the bankruptcy court stating that the claims did not exist after she learned 
about the claims,” the defendant seeking to apply judicial estoppel could not demonstrate the 
plaintiff had taken inconsistent positions under oath with an intent to mislead the court. Id. at 
1371. The court recognized 
that a delay in amending bankruptcy filings can be probative of a party’s intent, 
and a lengthy delay alone could warrant a finding that the plaintiff intended to 
mislead the bankruptcy court. However, four months, without more evidence 
indicating an intent to mislead, is too short a time to be conclusive, particularly 
when applying such an extraordinary remedy as judicial estoppel. 
Id. at 1374. Thus, even though the debtor “certainly could have moved more expeditiously in 
amending her bankruptcy schedule after” first learning about her claims, the court concluded 
that judicial estoppel was unwarranted. Id. Other courts in similar cases have reached similar 
results. See Thompson v. Quarles, 392 B.R. 517 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (refusing to bar, on judicial 
estoppel grounds, claim that arose after schedules were filed but before plan confirmation). 
Practitioners should not, however, assume that Snowden creates a per se rule that any 
delay of less than four months will be excused. The Snowden court emphasized that “courts 
‘must always give due consideration to all of the circumstances of a particular case’” when 
deciding whether to apply judicial estoppel, which would preclude any hard and fast rule. 
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debtor “had knowledge of [a] claim for an extended period of time”—in 
this case, a year and a half174—“before finally amending [his or] her 
bankruptcy petition, only disclosing it three weeks after Defendants moved 
to dismiss,” a court has found judicial estoppel warranted.175 
b) The Duty (or Lack Thereof) to Disclose Post-Confirmation, 
Predischarge Claims 
Courts have reached divergent results regarding whether a chapter 13 
debtor is obligated to disclose a claim that accrues post-confirmation but 
predischarge. Some courts hold that the cause of action need not be 
disclosed at all; the debtor will not be judicially estopped from pursuing 
that cause of action.176 Others hold that “‘bankruptcy debtors have an 
ongoing duty to amend their schedule of assets . . . including those acquired 
after a bankruptcy court has confirmed a bankruptcy plan,’”177 and the 
failure to fulfill this duty can trigger the application of judicial estoppel if 
the equities warrant.178 The split results in part from a textual conflict 
                                                                                                                 
419 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(11th Cir. 2002)). Moreover, the court in Snowden did suggest that a sufficiently long delay 
before amending could trigger the application of judicial estoppel. Id. at 1374. Finally, 
Snowden is obviously merely persuasive authority in all jurisdictions other than the Middle 
District of Alabama. Thus, even though Snowden suggests that courts will be more forgiving 
of a debtor who neglects to amend her schedules to include a newly discovered claim than a 
debtor who omits a preexisting claim from her schedules, debtors’ attorneys should 
nevertheless urge their clients to amend their schedules as promptly as possible should a new 
claim arise during the course of the debtor’s bankruptcy. 
 174. See DePasquale v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Civ. No. 10–6828 (WJM–
MF), 2011 WL 3703110, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2011). 
 175. Id. at *6; see also Elkins v. Summit Cnty., Ohio, No. 5:06-CV-3004, 2008 WL 
622038, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2008). 
 176. See, e.g., Muse v. Accord Human Res., Inc., 129 F. App’x 487, 488-90 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
 177. Gilbreath v. Averitt Express, Inc., Civ. Action No. 09-1922, 2010 WL 4554090, at 
*7 (W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2010) (quoting Henry v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., Civ.A. 10-0469, 2010 
WL 3613795 (W.D. La. Sept. 8, 2010)); see also Batten v. Cardwell (In re Batten) 351 B.R. 
256, 259 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006); cf. Riddle v. Chase Home Fin., No. 09-11182, 2010 WL 
3504020, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2010) (“Here, the plaintiff failed to supplement her 
disclosures to identify the present cause of action, even though the action was pending . . . 
by the time the plaintiff obtained a discharge of her debts from the bankruptcy court.”). 
Riddle does not specify, however, whether these post-petition claims arose pre- or post-
confirmation. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 2010 WL 3504030 (E.D. 
Mich. Jan. 13, 2010), which the district court adopted, 2010 WL 3504020, at *1, does not 
resolve the question either. 
 178. See, e.g., In re Adams, 481 B.R. 854, 859-61 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2012); Gilbreath, 
2010 WL 4554090, at *7. 
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between two arguably contradictory sections of chapter 13 of the Code, 
namely §§ 1306 and 1327.179 Courts have attempted to resolve this textual 
conflict in several ways.180 Given the split in authority, several courts, 
particularly district courts in the Fifth Circuit, have held that the very 
existence of doctrinal uncertainty regarding whether a debtor is duty-bound 
to disclose a cause of action that arises post-confirmation is a factor that 
strongly weighs against the application of judicial estoppel.181 The rationale 
is that a debtor should not be judicially estopped for failing to comply with 
uncertain, poorly defined, and contested legal obligations.  
Given this confusion, courts have attempted to reconcile § 1306 with § 
1327 of the Code.182 Section 1306(a) provides that “[p]roperty of the estate 
includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 . . . all 
property . . . the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case.” On 
the other hand, § 1327(c) of the Code states, “Except as otherwise provided 
in the plan or order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the 
debtor . . . is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided 
for by the plan.” 
Courts have developed many approaches to reconcile the two, and the 
“reconciliation approach” has gained the most support among courts, 
including the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.183 Under this approach, 
“property that exists at confirmation vests in the debtor under section 1327, 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Code § 1306(a)(1) “states that the bankruptcy estate includes property ‘that the 
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, 
or converted.’” Gilbreath, 2010 WL 4554090, at *4. Code § 1327(b)-(c) “provides, ‘Except 
as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan 
vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor . . . free and clear of any claim or interest 
of any creditor provided for by the plan.’” Id. “Thus, while Section 1306 indicates that the 
bankruptcy estate continues to accrue assets after confirmation of a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, 
a plausible reading of Section 1327 is that any property a debtor acquires post-confirmation 
is owned free and clear by the debtor and excluded from the bankruptcy estate.” Id. (citing 
Woodard v. Taco Bueno Rests., Inc., Civ. Action No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, 
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006)). As a result, these two sections have been described as 
“facially inconsistent.” Woodard, 2006 WL 3542693, at *4. 
 180. For a concise but useful summary of these approaches, see, for example, Byrd v. 
Wyeth, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 803, 804-09 (S.D. Miss. 2012); Gilbreath, 2010 WL 4554090, 
at *3-7; Woodard, 2006 WL 3542693, at *4-11; In re Powers, 435 B.R. 385, 387-88 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 181. See, e.g., Byrd, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 804-07; Gilbreath, 2010 WL 4554090, at *3-7; 
Woodard, 2006 WL 3542693, at *4-11. 
 182. See, e.g., Powers, 435 B.R. at 387-89; Waldron v. Brown (In re Waldron), 536 F.3d 
1239, 1241-43 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 183. See Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1241-43; see also Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31 (1st 
Cir. 2000); Sec. Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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but property acquired after confirmation funds the chapter 13 estate, which 
continues to exist post-confirmation.”184 To illustrate, an estate is created 
upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition by virtue of § 541 of the Code, 
which consists of “all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as 
of the commencement of the case.”185 Section 1306 expands the definition 
of the estate as provided by § 541 to broadly include “all property” that a 
“debtor acquires after the commencement of the case, but before the case is 
closed, dismissed, or converted.”186 Section 1327 operates to determine the 
status of estate property as it exists on the date of confirmation.187 
Therefore, under this approach, any property (including claims) that arises 
post-confirmation, which by definition is not contemplated by Code § 1327, 
is subsumed by Code § 1306 and becomes estate property. Courts seem to 
favor this approach because “it gives effect to the language of both sections 
1306(a) and 1327(b).”188 
Thus, while the fact remains that some courts are still split on this issue, 
the reconciliation approach is the most logical approach to deal with claims 
that arise during the pendency of a debtor’s bankruptcy case. However, 
given the uncertainty surrounding the issue, this article recommends that 
debtor’s attorneys encourage their clients to disclose claims that accrue post 
confirmation as soon as possible. Note, however, there does not appear to 
be a duty to disclose claims that arise post-discharge, as they are not 
property of the bankruptcy estate.189 
  
                                                                                                                 
 184. Powers, 435 B.R. at 388 (citing Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re 
Rodriguez), 421 B.R. 356, 374 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
 185. CODE § 541(a)(1). 
 186. Id. § 1306(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 187. “Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the 
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor . . . free and clear 
of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.” Id. § 1327(b)-(c) (emphasis 
added). 
 188. In re Hymond, No. 09-45346-dml-13, 2012 WL 6692196, at *3, (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Powers, 435 B.R. at 388). 
 189. See Biggs v. AM Gen., LLC, No. 3:07-CV-28 JVB, 2008 WL 1957864, at *3-4 
(N.D. Ind. May 1, 2008); see also Galin v. United States, No. 08-CV-2508, 2008 WL 
5378387, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008). For an interesting case splitting groups of 
plaintiffs into subgroups on the basis of timing of discharge/timing of closing of the 
bankruptcy case (but, troublingly, not on the basis of timing of confirmation), see Wilson v. 
Guardian Angel Nursing, Inc., No. 3:07-0069, 2009 WL 790107, at *10-12 (M.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 24, 2009). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/2
2014]        RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL 495 
 
 
c) Statutes of Limitation: When Does a Claim Arise? 
In Kaufman v. Robinson Property Group, L.P., the Northern District of 
Mississippi ruled that a chapter 7 consumer debtor’s personal injury claim 
was barred on judicial estoppel grounds for failure to list the claim on her 
schedules.190 What sets Kaufman apart from the cases previously discussed 
is that the statute of limitations period for the claim had expired prior to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing.191 Because the defendant casino “had agreed to 
settle [the debtor’s] claim but delayed settlement by various means until the 
limitations period expired,” the claim was revived by equitable estoppel.192 
Thus, argued the debtor-plaintiff, the claim was not a live asset of the estate 
at the time of filing, and therefore it did not need to be listed on her 
bankruptcy schedules.193 The court disagreed: “[T]he plaintiff was aware of 
she [sic] had contingent and unliquidated claims arising from her alleged 
injury . . . and that she pursued those claims . . . well after she filed her 
bankruptcy petition and ultimately filed a lawsuit well after she received 
her discharge.”194 Quoting Fifth Circuit precedent, the court noted that 
“[a]lleged confusion as to a limitations period does not evince a lack of 
knowledge as to the existence of the claim.”195 Thus, reasoned the court, the 
debtor was required to disclose the claim, the failure to disclose the claim 
was advertent, and the debtor was therefore judicially estopped from 
pursuing it.196 
The foregoing analysis presents the question—when does a claim arise 
such that the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules might need to be amended to 
reflect the newly arising claim? According to some courts, a claim accrues 
for judicial estoppel purposes when the debtor suffers the wrongful 
conduct, rather than when the debtor has exhausted her remedies.197 “A 
debtor ‘need not know all the facts or even the legal basis for the cause of 
action;’” if the debtor has sufficient information before confirmation to 
                                                                                                                 
 190. 661 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626-27 (N.D. Miss. 2009), motion to amend denied, Civ. 
Action No. 2:07CV048-P-A, 2009 WL 3003261 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 16, 2009), aff’d 373 F. 
App’x. 494 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 191. Id. at 624. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 627. 
 195. Id. (quoting Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P & I Underwriters (In re Superior 
Crewboats, Inc.), 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 196. Id. at 626-27. 
 197. Harrah v. DSW Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 900, 906 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Wallace v. 
Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Grp., Inc., 2007 WL 927929, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2007)). 
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indicate that a cause of action may exist, “then the debtor has a ‘known’ 
cause of action that must be disclosed.”198 
4. Creditors Are Not Subject to the Same Disclosure Obligations as 
Debtors 
The previous cases have involved nondisclosure of assets by a consumer 
debtor in bankruptcy. What happens when a creditor fails to disclose the 
full amount of its claims against the debtor in debtor’s bankruptcy? Is the 
creditor judicially estopped from asserting the full amount in the subsequent 
lawsuit? The sections below discuss how some courts have answered these 
questions. 
a) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji 
In 2012, on the facts of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re 
Oparaji), the Fifth Circuit ruled that judicial estoppel was not warranted.199 
The debtor took out a home mortgage from the creditor but soon fell behind 
on his payments.200 The debtor accordingly filed bankruptcy (the First 
Bankruptcy) under chapter 13 of the Code.201 Throughout the First 
Bankruptcy, the creditor filed multiple proofs of claim, but did not include 
the full amount of post-petition arrearages owed to it by the debtor in each 
amended proof of claim.202 The First Bankruptcy was then dismissed 
without granting the debtor a discharge, because the debtor “was in default 
of $7,809.18 in plan payments and the case had exceeded the statutory time 
limit set by [Code section] 1322(d).”203 
The debtor continued to fall behind on mortgage payments and property 
taxes, and therefore filed bankruptcy again (the Second Bankruptcy).204 The 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Smith v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, No. 03-2360 M1/AN, 2005 WL 2210208 
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2005), at *4 (quoting Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, 
Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 199. 698 F.3d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 200. Id. at 233. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 236. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion does not specify or speculate why the creditor 
did not include the entirety of the post-petition arrearages in its amended proofs of claim, but 
notes that “[t]he District Court speculate[d] that [the creditor] wanted to ‘facilitate the 
success of [Debtor’s] bankruptcy, believing that a successful bankruptcy plan would result in 
a higher payoff to [the creditor].’” Id. at 238 (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In 
re Oparaji), 458 B.R. 881, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2011)). The court noted that the creditor “waived 
the issue of inadvertence” on appeal by “choosing not to address the issue in its briefing to 
this Court.” Id. at 236 n.1. 
 203. Id. at 234. 
 204. Id. 
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creditor filed a claim in the Second Bankruptcy that included amounts that 
were not, but could have been, claimed in the First Bankruptcy.205 
The bankruptcy court and the district court, analogizing to the cases 
where a debtor fails to satisfy its disclosure requirements in bankruptcy, 
ruled that the creditor was judicially estopped from asserting a claim for the 
remainder of the arrearages.206 The Fifth Circuit reversed for abuse of 
discretion.207 The court first explained that judicial estoppel is generally 
predicated upon a court’s acceptance of a party’s legally inconsistent 
position,208 but in this case the creditor asserted no legally inconsistent 
position.209 The court held, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, that 
creditors are not subject to precisely the same disclosure requirements in 
chapter 13 as debtors, and are therefore not “legally required to include all 
accrued post-petition arrearages in each amended claim they submit.”210  
Notably, Code § 1305(a) states that a “proof of claim may,” not shall, 
“be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor.”211 According 
to the Fifth Circuit, the lower courts failed to identify any law that would 
require the creditor to “seek the full amount to which it is entitled in each 
amended claim.”212 Moreover, the court noted an important 
difference between a debtor who has failed to disclose an asset 
and a creditor who has failed to include all accrued interest in 
each revised claim. In the first instance, the creditor has no way 
of knowing about the concealed asset except through the 
debtor’s disclosure. In the second instance, however, the debtor 
has the ability and responsibility to keep track of his outstanding 
debt.213 
Thus, because the creditor had not violated any disclosure obligations 
imposed by chapter 13, it did not assert a legally inconsistent position in the 
Second Bankruptcy, so judicial estoppel could not be applied.214 
Having thus disposed of the case, the court nonetheless proceeded to 
explain in dicta that the movant had also failed to satisfy the element of 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 236. 
 207. Id. at 237. 
 208. Id. at 235 (citing Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 236. 
 211. Id. at 236 n.2. 
 212. Id. at 236. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 237.  
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judicial acceptance.215 The court stated that the element of judicial 
acceptance “ensures that judicial estoppel is only applied in situations 
where the integrity of the judiciary is jeopardized” by the “risk of 
inconsistent results.”216 The court then explained that although the 
bankruptcy court had initially accepted the legal position inherent in the 
creditor’s claims in the First Bankruptcy, that acceptance was “revoked 
when [the First Bankruptcy] was dismissed without a discharge,”217 because 
predischarge dismissal of a bankruptcy case “undo[es] the bankruptcy case, 
as far as practicable,” and “restores the status quo ante.”218  
The court concluded by explaining why principles of equity counseled 
against the application of judicial estoppel in this case. Characterizing “a 
Chapter 13 plan as an ‘exchanged for bargain between the debtor and the 
debtor’s creditors,’”219 the court explained that the debtor failed to fulfill his 
end of the bargain “when his failure to make payments resulted in the 
bankruptcy’s [sic] being dismissed without a discharge.”220 As a result, 
equity did not permit the debtor to hold the creditor to the terms of the plan 
of the First Bankruptcy.221 Furthermore, the court found no evidence in the 
record that the creditor received a disproportionate or unfair benefit at the 
debtor’s expense.222 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. at 237-38. 
 216. Id. at 237 (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 
1982)). 
 217. Id. at 238; see also infra Part I.B.7. 
 218. Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 238 (quoting In re Sanitate, 415 B.R. 98, 105 (E.D. Pa. 2009)). 
 219. Id. (quoting In re Hufford, 460 B.R. 172, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. The court explained:  
In an attempt to justify its decision to apply judicial estoppel, the District Court 
notes several possible motives behind Wells Fargo’s submission of the 
incomplete arrearage claims in the First Bankruptcy. None of them, however, 
demonstrate that Wells Fargo received a disproportionate benefit from its 
actions. The District Court speculates that Wells Fargo wanted to “facilitate the 
success of [Debtor’s] bankruptcy, believing that a successful bankruptcy plan 
would result in a higher payoff to Wells Fargo.” But, taken as true, this still 
does not show that Wells Fargo gained an unfair benefit at Debtor’s expense. 
At best, it shows that Wells Fargo sought to promote the success of the 
bankruptcy for its benefit and the much greater benefit of Debtor. Thus, even if 
the Bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the First Bankruptcy had not negated its 
earlier acceptance, equity would still counsel against the application of judicial 
estoppel. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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b) In re Munoz: The Relevance of Dismissal of a Prior Bankruptcy Case 
Although dismissal of a bankruptcy “‘returns the parties . . . to the 
position they were in at the time of filing with respect to their property 
rights[, i]t does not erase all history. Parties may still face consequences as 
a result of the earlier bankruptcy.’”223 Indeed, some courts have held that 
when a debtor’s chapter 13 plan is dismissed after confirmation, a creditor 
will be judicially estopped from taking an inconsistent position regarding 
the nature of its claim in a subsequent bankruptcy case.224 
For example, in Munoz, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas held that when a creditor filed a proof of claim 
as a secured creditor, accepted multiple payments under a confirmed 
chapter 13 plan, and never objected to its treatment under such plan, it 
would be judicially estopped in a subsequent bankruptcy case from 
claiming that the same underlying debt is a lease and not a secured claim.225  
c) Conclusion 
The foregoing demonstrates that although judicial estoppel is a strong 
weapon for creditors to use against debtors, it is not always readily 
available for debtors to use against creditors. While creditors’ disclosure 
obligations are not as stringent as those imposed upon debtors in 
bankruptcy, courts will not allow a creditor to change the nature of its claim 
in a separate proceeding to gain an unfair advantage.226 Nevertheless, 
Oparaji, coupled with Reed and the presumption of advertence cases, 
represents a pro-creditor trend in judicial estoppel cases, which arguably 
further reflects what many commentators perceive to be recent pro-creditor 
trends in bankruptcy and debtor-creditor law generally.227 
                                                                                                                 
 223. In re Munoz, 459 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (quoting Oparaji, 454 B.R. 
at 731). 
 224. See, e.g., Munoz, 459 B.R. at 623; see also In re Alaniz, No. 11-20475, 2012 WL 
3862622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012). 
 225. In re Munoz, 459 B.R. at 623.  
 226. Compare Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 236, with Munoz, 459 B.R. at 623. 
 227. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Gutcho & David A. Fidler, Purchasing Claims to Block 
Bankruptcy “Cramdown” Plans: A New Weapon for Creditors, 115 BANKING L.J. 4, 10 
(1998); Richard P. Tobin, Note, Bankruptcy – Excusable Neglect – Consideration of 
Equitable Factors Is Permitted for Late Chapter 11 Proof of Claim Filings Under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) to Determine if Filer’s Conduct Constituted Excusable 
Neglect – Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993), 24 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1056, 1085 (1993); Brian K. Van Engen, Nobelman v. American Savings Bank: The 
Supreme Court’s Answer Raises More Questions, 20 J. CORP. L. 363, 386 (1995). But see 
Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter in Bankruptcy? Voting 
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5. Attorney Error Will Not Necessarily Protect a Nondisclosing Party 
from Judicial Estoppel 
Even where a debtor fails to disclose an asset or claim on her schedules 
due to erroneous legal advice, many courts have not hesitated to visit the 
sins of the attorney upon the debtor, and have applied judicial estoppel 
regardless.228 
A particularly egregious case illustrating this principle is Galin v. IRS.229 
In Galin, the debtor was a seventy-three-year-old divorcee left responsible 
for massive criminal liabilities incurred by her estranged husband.230 The 
debtor omitted certain property interests from her bankruptcy petition after 
                                                                                                                 
Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919 (2012) (examining 
empirical evidence and finding “no evidence that circuit court judges engage in ideological 
voting in bankruptcy cases”). 
In particular, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA), Pub L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, was generally considered to be a pro-creditor 
development. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: 
Cuba and the IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 497, 533 n.138 (2006); Assaf Lichtash, 
Realigning the American Consumer Bankruptcy System with the Goals of the Fresh-Start 
Doctrine: A Global Comparative Analysis, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 169, 190 
(2011); Shaun Mulreed, In re Blair Misses the Mark: An Alternative Interpretation of the 
BAPCPA’s Homestead Exemption, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1071, 1074-75 (2006); Bruce C. 
Scalambrino, Bankruptcy Reform for Non-Bankruptcy Lawyers, 93 ILL. B.J. 518 (2005); 
Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 553, 574-83 (2010). 
 228. See Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448-49 (7th Cir. 2006).  
In the district court [the debtor] filed an affidavit asserting that her false 
statement on the bankruptcy schedules was the result of good-faith . . . legal 
advice. . . . Yet bad legal advice does not relieve the client of the consequences 
of her own acts. . . . Whether the bankruptcy fraud was [the debtor’s lawyer’s] 
suggestion . . . or [the debtor’s] own bright idea does not matter in the end. The 
signature on the bankruptcy schedule is hers. The representation she made is 
false; she obtained the benefit of a discharge; she never tried to make the 
creditors whole; now she wants to contradict herself in order to win a second 
case. Judicial estoppel blocks any attempt to realize on this claim for her 
personal benefit. 
Id.; accord Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “[a]lthough it is undisputed that Barger’s attorney failed to list Barger’s 
discrimination suit on the schedule of assets despite the fact that Barger specifically told him 
about the suit, the attorney’s omission” does not preclude the application of judicial 
estoppel); Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. App’x 420, 427-29 (6th Cir. 2005); In re 
Williams, 310 B.R. 442, 443-44 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004). But see infra note 246 and 
accompanying text. 
 229. 563 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 230. Id. at 334-35. 
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she was advised by her attorney at the outset of her bankruptcy case that she 
had no legal interest or claim of ownership in the property at issue.231 
Acknowledging that advertence is presumed in many courts only when the 
debtor has knowledge of her claims,232 the United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut “accept[ed] that [the debtor] had no knowledge 
of her potential property interest and her bankruptcy attorney did not advise 
her of any such interest.”233 Though the court appeared to accept that the 
debtor’s failure therefore constituted a good faith mistake,234 it nonetheless 
applied judicial estoppel against the debtor on the grounds that “legal 
advice and ignorance of the law are not defenses to judicial estoppel.”235 
Per the court: 
The Court regrets coming to this conclusion and denying a 
remedy to Mrs. Galin who, after being betrayed and bankrupted 
by her husband’s misconduct, also appears to have been misled 
by ill-informed legal counsel. But as sympathetic a plaintiff as 
Mrs. Galin is, the law does not permit her to turn around and 
assert a claim to the [property] after failing to disclose her 
ownership interest in her bankruptcy proceeding.236  
Accordingly, the court judicially estopped the debtor from asserting her 
claim to the property.237  
Galin is disturbing in several respects. First, the court knew, and 
explicitly stated, that “[j]udicial estoppel . . . is an equitable doctrine 
invoked by a court at its discretion.”238 If the court “regret[ted] coming to 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 335. 
According to her affidavit . . . [debtor] states that she had been advised that 
New York and Connecticut are both “title” states, meaning that she had no 
interest in the [property] because her verbal lease with [her estranged 
husband] . . . was unenforceable pursuant to the Connecticut statute of 
frauds. . . . Not until she initiated divorce proceedings several years later did 
she learn that she could assert an equitable ownership interest in her marital 
property dating back to its purchase date. 
Id. at 335-36. 
 232. Id. at 340-41 (citing cases discussed supra Part I.B.2). 
 233. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
 234. See id. at 340-41. 
 235. Id. at 341 (citing Negron v. Weiss, No. 06-CV-1288 (CBA), 2006 WL 2792769, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006); Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 339 (emphasis added) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 
(2001)). 
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this conclusion,”239 it could have—and should have—exercised its 
discretion not to estop the debtor. This is not necessarily to say that attorney 
error should always absolve a debtor, or that courts should never apply 
judicial estoppel when doing so makes them queasy; it is merely to say that 
the decision to apply judicial estoppel is never inevitable. Indeed, case law 
from other jurisdictions establishes that a court may decline to apply 
judicial estoppel even when all of the elements are met.240 To be sure, as 
noted previously, many appellate courts either explicitly or implicitly treat 
judicial estoppel as a nondiscretionary doctrine to be reviewed de novo.241 
We also recognize and accept that because judicial estoppel is designed to 
protect the courts rather than to protect the parties or to punish wrongdoing, 
courts will occasionally judicially estop sympathetic litigants and 
bamboozled septuagenarians. We merely note that the decision to estop the 
debtor in Galin was not inevitable, and courts should be wary of following 
Galin’s rationale. 
The other major problem with Galin is that it appears to transform the 
already very strong presumption of advertence into a super-presumption. 
Whereas most of the presumption of advertence cases previously discussed 
establish that a failure to disclose assets will be deemed inadvertent when 
the debtor has either no knowledge of the assets or no motive to conceal 
them,242 Galin expressly holds that a nondisclosing debtor may be estopped 
even when the debtor has no knowledge of her assets.243 This is particularly 
troubling given that many courts are beginning to presume that the motive 
to conceal virtually always exists, as discussed previously.244 The combined 
effect of Galin and the aforementioned Fifth Circuit presumption cases, if 
the rationales of those cases were adopted by other courts, would be to 
make the presumption of advertence not merely virtually irrebuttable, but 
actually irrebuttable. Both knowledge and motive would become 
completely irrelevant, and any nondisclosure would automatically trigger 
judicial estoppel.  
                                                                                                                 
 239. Id. at 341. 
 240. See, e.g., Byrd v. Wyeth, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Miss. 2012); Gilbreath v. 
Averitt Express, Inc., Civ. Action No. 09-1922, 2010 WL 4554090, at *8 (W.D. La. Nov. 3, 
2010). 
 241. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 242. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 243. See Galin, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 340-41. 
 244. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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However, not every court follows the harsh analysis of Galin, or even the 
more moderate result reached by other courts.245 Some have held or 
suggested that judicial estoppel may indeed be inapplicable when the 
nondisclosure had its genesis in attorney error.246 
That said, when a litigant is judicially estopped from bringing a claim 
due to a failure to disclose stemming from attorney error, that litigant does 
not necessarily lack a remedy, as that attorney may be subject to 
malpractice liability to the litigant.247 Counsel must therefore take caution. 
Paradoxically, in some circumstances, judicial estoppel for nondisclosure 
in bankruptcy can protect attorneys from malpractice actions. In In re Alan 
DeAtley Litigation,248 an individual (Alan) alleged legal malpractice on the 
part of his prior litigation counsel (Prior Counsel) for reasons unrelated to 
nondisclosure of claims in bankruptcy.249 Alan had retained Prior Counsel 
to pursue a claim against his father (the Underlying Claim).250 However, 
Alan had previously declared personal bankruptcy under chapter 7 and 
received a discharge.251 Even though the Underlying Claim existed at the 
time Alan filed for bankruptcy, he knowingly failed to list the Underlying 
Claim on his schedules or amend them to include it.252 The court therefore 
held that Alan’s malpractice claim against Prior Counsel must fail, because 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See, e.g., supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Sharp v. Oakwood United Hosps., 458 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(holding judicial estoppel inapplicable where the court is “persuaded by Plaintiff’s assertion 
that she relied in good faith on the advice of her counsel”); Taylor v. Comcast Cablevision 
of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796-99 (E.D. Ark. 2003) (concluding that judicial 
estoppel is unwarranted in part because of debtor’s reliance on attorney’s conduct); see also 
Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 21-22 (describing cases in which courts “have been 
more understanding towards pro se debtors, those justifiably relying on the legal advice of 
counsel, and those otherwise lacking legal sophistication”). 
 247. Arruda v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 2:06-cv-2308-MCE-EFB, 2007 WL 754627, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (citing Estel v. Bigelow Mgmt. Inc., 323 B.R. 918 (E.D. Tex. 
2005)). 
 248. No. CV-06-0278-JLQ, 2008 WL 4153675 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2008). 
 249. Id. at 2. 
The malpractice alleged to have occurred involved the failure of counsel to 
diligently prepare [Alan’s] case by allegedly failing to retain accounting and 
handwriting/authentication experts, failing to oversee associates working on the 
case, failing to disclose they were closing their office, failing to adequately 
conduct discovery, neglecting to file motions, losing original documents, and 
trying to cover up their actions. 
Id. 
 250. Id. at *1. 
 251. Id. at *3-4. 
 252. Id. at *3-4, *15-18. 
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as a matter of law Alan could not prove that he would have succeeded in 
the litigation against his father had Prior Counsel acted differently.253 The 
applicable test for malpractice “require[d] the former client prove that but 
for the attorney’s negligence,” the former client “would have been 
successful in the prosecution of the original suit.”254 Because the 
Underlying Claim would be barred by judicial estoppel, Alan could not 
possibly have succeeded in the prior litigation, and thus Prior Counsel could 
not be found liable for malpractice.255 
6. Appearing Pro Se Generally Does Not Excuse Nondisclosure 
Most courts hold that just as attorney error will generally not preclude 
the application of judicial estoppel, a nondisclosing pro se debtor will not 
be subject to a more lenient standard than represented litigants.256 Per the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, “if the 
Court were to equate lack of legal training regarding a statutory duty to 
disclose or absence of affirmative efforts to conceal the claim with 
excusable mistake or inadvertence, it would undermine the familiar maxim 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Id. at *9. 
 254. Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (citing Schmidt v. Coogan, 173 P.3d 273, 274 (Wash. 
2007)). 
 255. Id. at *16-18.  
[Prior Counsel] has met its prima facie burden of showing that Alan’s breach of 
contract claims would not have been viable against his father because . . . his 
attempt would have been judicially estopped. Moreover, Alan has not 
demonstrated there would have been sufficient evidence to avoid summary 
judgment in the underlying action. There is no escape from the conclusion 
herein that Alan is unable to establish the essential element of his malpractice 
claim which requires he prove on a more probable than not basis that but for his 
attorneys’ negligence, he would have fared better in the underlying action. 
Accordingly, Alan’s legal malpractice counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety. 
Id. at *18. The court additionally held that Alan would be barred from pursuing the 
Underlying Claim on the grounds of standing. Id. at *11-14. 
 256. See, e.g., Banh v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C11-05744 HRL, 2012 WL 1670211, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) (“The fact that [the debtors] proceeded pro se in their 
bankruptcy matters does not, by itself, insulate them from application of [judicial 
estoppel].”); see also Caviness v. England, No. CIV S-04-2388 GEB DAD PS, 2007 WL 
1302522, at *7, *13 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2007) (judicially estopping a plaintiff despite the 
plaintiff’s request that the court afford him a greater degree of solicitude because he had 
previously appeared pro se), findings and recommendations adopted by 2007 WL 
1577707 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2007); cf. Clark v. Strober-Haddonfield Grp. Inc., Civ. No. 07-
910 (RBK), 2008 WL 2945972, at *1-4 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (applying judicial estoppel 
against pro se litigant without analyzing whether the litigant’s pro se status should affect the 
court’s analysis). But see infra note 259 and accompanying text. 
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that, even for pro se litigants, ignorance of the law is no excuse.”257 Nor 
will neglect due to high stress excuse a pro se litigant from fulfilling her 
bankruptcy obligations.258 Other courts, however, appear to disagree.259 
7. Judicial Acceptance and the Effect of Dismissal, Settlement, or 
Amendment 
As discussed above, one of the elements typically applied in the judicial 
estoppel inquiry is judicial acceptance; the movant must show that the party 
to be estopped previously convinced a court to adopt her earlier position, 
such “that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later 
proceeding would create ‘the perception that either the first or the second 
court was misled.’”260 “[J]udicial estoppel is not appropriate if the litigant 
was unable to convince the court of its initial position.”261 In the consumer 
bankruptcy context, the judicial acceptance element can be satisfied “in 
many ways,” such as when a court “lift[s] a stay based in part on the 
debtor’s nondisclosure in its bankruptcy schedules;” “approve[s] the 
debtor’s plan of reorganization;” or “approve[s] [the debtor’s] amended 
schedules and modifie[s] her Chapter 13 plan of reorganization.”262 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Riddle v. Chase Home Fin., No. 09-11182, 2010 WL 3504020, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 2, 2010) (citing Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 
F.3d 552, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2000)); cf. Arruda v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 2:06-cv-2308-MCE-
EFB, 2007 WL 754627, at *1, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (applying judicial estoppel 
against a litigant with an alleged mental disability, holding that the litigant could not claim 
the failure to list his claims was a mistake or the product of inadvertence). 
 258. See Jackson v. Communicare Health Servs., No. 1:06 CV 1948, 2009 WL 455410, 
at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2009). 
 259. See, e.g., Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 WL 
109065, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008) (“A pro se bankruptcy applicant’s failure to declare two 
exempt assets is not sufficient evidence for a finding of bad faith.”); Taylor v. Comcast 
Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796-99 (E.D. Ark. 2003); see also Beiner & 
Chapman, supra note 1, at 21-22 (describing cases in which courts “have been more 
understanding towards pro se debtors, those justifiably relying on the legal advice of 
counsel, and those otherwise lacking legal sophistication”). 
 260. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 261. Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank, Bankr. No. 08-12504, Adversary No. 11-01619, 
2011 WL 5900811 at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) (citing G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance 
Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 262. Simoneau v. Nike, Inc., No. 04-CV-1733-BR, 2006 WL 977302, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 
6, 2006) (citing Hailton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 547, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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As noted in the discussion of Oparaji,263 that court held that although the 
bankruptcy court had initially accepted the creditor’s legal position, that 
acceptance was “revoked when [the First Bankruptcy] was dismissed 
without a discharge,”264 because predischarge dismissal of a bankruptcy 
case “undo[es] the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable,” and “restores the 
status quo ante.”265 In other words, Oparaji holds that dismissal of the 
bankruptcy case can circumvent the judicial acceptance element of judicial 
estoppel. 
Other courts agree with this proposition.266 For example, in Perez v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,267 the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California refused to apply judicial estoppel where the debtor 
allegedly failed to disclose her claims to the bankruptcy court, but the 
bankruptcy case was dismissed prior to plan confirmation or discharge: 
Defendants cannot establish that the bankruptcy court accepted 
or relied upon [the plaintiff-debtor’s] representation as to 
whether she had any claims. . . . [T]he bankruptcy action . . . was 
dismissed as a result of [the plaintiff-debtor’s] failure to submit 
required documents and appear at required hearings. As a result, 
there is no danger of inconsistent outcomes. Further, in light of 
the fact that the bankruptcy proceeding was dropped before any 
bankruptcy plan was adopted, there is no unfairness to [the 
Defendants] that will result from allowing [the plaintiff-debtor] 
to proceed with the claims in this case.268 
The Perez court further “reject[ed] the assertion” that the judicial 
acceptance element was met solely on the grounds the plaintiff-debtor 
“benefitted from the bankruptcy proceeding by obtaining an automatic stay 
against their creditors.”269 Judicial estoppel could not be predicated solely 
                                                                                                                 
 263. See supra Part I.B.4.a. 
 264. 698 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 265. Id. (quoting In re Sanitate, 415 B.R. 98, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009)). 
 266. See, e.g., Wilson v. Guardian Angel Nursing, Inc., No. 3:07-0069, 2009 WL 
790107, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2009) (“Opt–Ins whose bankruptcy proceedings were 
terminated or dismissed―will not be judicially estopped from proceeding in this case 
because they did not succeed in persuading a prior court of a position inconsistent with the 
one being asserted here.”); Ben-Ami v. Katz (In re Ben-Ami), 348 B.R. 320, 326 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2006) (holding the element of judicial acceptance not met where first bankruptcy 
case “dismissed without confirmation of a plan”). 
 267. No. C-11-02279 JCS, 2011 WL 3809808 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011). 
 268. Id. at *12. 
 269. Id. 
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on the entry of the automatic stay because “[a] stay would have been 
entered in the bankruptcy action regardless of whether [the plaintiff-debtor] 
listed any claims in her bankruptcy filings.”270 In other words, the 
bankruptcy court did not rely on any position taken by the debtor when 
deciding whether to stay creditor actions—the automatic stay is, as the 
name suggests, automatic. Thus, the mere fact that a debtor benefits from 
the automatic stay cannot satisfy the judicial acceptance prerequisite for 
judicial estoppel. 
This is true even if the debtor’s failure to disclose is indisputable. As the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts noted in 
DiVittorio v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. (In re DiVittorio),271 
Without question, no such claim appeared on the Debtor’s 
schedules, but unlike the cases which have applied the doctrine, I 
have not granted the Debtor any relief, such as a discharge, 
based upon representations made in them. Indeed, the Debtor 
could still amend his schedules and Chapter 13 plan to reflect an 
omitted asset if necessary. For that reason, confirmation of the 
Debtor’s plan would not amount to “acceptance of a position” in 
the same manner.272 
The DiVittorio court likewise stated that “a court does not accept the legal 
or factual allegations of the underlying matter” for judicial estoppel 
purposes “by approving a settlement.”273 Thus, neither a settled nor a 
dismissed bankruptcy case can satisfy the judicial acceptance element. The 
same may be said of stipulations and modifications, which are “[b]oth . . . 
in the nature of a settlement.”274 
Some courts hold that judicial estoppel is not warranted where (1) the 
debtor amends her schedules to list a previously undisclosed preexisting 
claim subsequent to filing but prior to discharge; and (2) the movant fails to 
                                                                                                                 
 270. Id. 
 271. 430 B.R. 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).  
 272. Id. at 48 (citations omitted). 
 273. Id. (citing Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 61 
(1st Cir. 2004)); accord Hilmo, supra note 1, at 1362 (citing In re Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 
356 B.R. 93, 106-07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 274. DiVittorio, 430 B.R. at 48. Note, however, that the DiVittorio court ultimately ruled 
in favor of the lender and against the debtor, even though it ruled against the lender on the 
judicial estoppel issue. Id. at 55-56. The court’s statements regarding judicial estoppel may 
therefore be dicta. 
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identify any court order demonstrating that the court relied upon the 
information in the debtor’s initial, allegedly defective schedules.275 
Some courts suggest that where “the Debtor’s bankruptcy case is still 
pending, assets have not been distributed, debts have not been discharged, 
and her case has not yet been closed,” judicial estoppel is generally 
inappropriate.276 Per the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi, “[t]o judicially estop the Debtor from pursuing her 
counterclaims against” a defendant at a “relatively early stage of her 
bankruptcy case would turn the doctrine on its head.”277 
Predictably, not all courts agree with the foregoing. In particular, courts 
in the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly stated that the subsequent dismissal of 
the bankruptcy case does not render the judicial acceptance element 
unsatisfied.278 Likewise, in Clark v. Strober-Haddonfield Group 
Incorporated,279 the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey found that the fact that a nondisclosing debtor-plaintiff’s bankruptcy 
case was dismissed without a discharge was irrelevant to the judicial 
estoppel inquiry.280 Additionally, some cases flag the issue that a prior 
dismissal might affect the judicial estoppel calculus, but then proceed to 
estop the litigant without expressly analyzing why the element of judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Hancock Bank v. Bates (In re Bates), Bankr. No. 09–51279–NPO, Adversary No. 
09–05092–NPO, 2010 WL 2203634, at *14 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 27, 2010). 
 276. See id. at *15. Although the Bates court made this statement in the context of 
analyzing the unfair advantage element, this language appears more relevant to the issue of 
judicial acceptance. Note that Bates states that “[t]he mere fact of nondisclosure is not in 
itself sufficient to infer an intent to mislead or deceive the Court.” Bates, 2010 WL 2203634, 
at *15. The Southern District of Mississippi is within the Fifth Circuit; it is therefore 
possible that Bates does not survive the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
677 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2012). See supra Part I.B.2. 
 277. Bates, 2010 WL 2203634, at *15. 
 278. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992)); 
see also, e.g., Banh v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C11-05744 HRL, 2012 WL 1670211 (N.D. 
Cal. May 14, 2012). 
 279. Civ. No. 07-910 (RBK), 2008 WL 2945972 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008). 
 280. Id. at *3 (“Plaintiff’s failure to properly list his claim as a potential asset in his 
bankruptcy filings undermines the disclosure requirements, which are ‘are crucial to the 
effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy system.’ This is true regardless of the 
outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also 
Pryor v. Deberry (In re Pryor), 341 B.R. 571, 575-77 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2006) (applying 
judicial estoppel even though prior discharge vacated). Note, however, that as an 
unpublished opinion the persuasive effect of Clark is limited. 
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acceptance remains satisfied notwithstanding the dismissal of the 
bankruptcy case.281  
Judicial estoppel’s status as an equitable doctrine allows courts to reach 
such divergent results based on each unique set of facts before them. Due to 
the split in opinion, this article presents two different arguments regarding 
the interplay between the judicial estoppel doctrine and the judicial 
acceptance element below. The first argues that the dismissal of a 
bankruptcy case entails that a subsequent court should not judicially estop 
litigants on the basis of positions taken during that case, even if that case 
was confirmed prior to dismissal. The opposite argument is that dismissal 
should be irrelevant to the judicial acceptance inquiry; if the bankruptcy 
court confirmed the case, then it relied upon positions advanced by the 
debtor in her petition and subsequent court filings, and the judicial 
acceptance element is met even if the case was dismissed prior to the 
completion of the confirmed plan. 
a) Subsequent Dismissal Should Entail That the Prior Court Never 
Accepted the Prior Inconsistent Position 
The first approach relies on the policy of the Code’s equitable principles 
to guide a judicial acceptance analysis. The judicial acceptance inquiry is 
particularly difficult in the consumer bankruptcy context due to, among 
other things, the debtor’s right to amend “[a] voluntary petition, list, 
schedule, or statement . . . at any time before the case is closed.”282 A case 
is “closed” pursuant to Code § 350 “after the estate is fully 
administered.”283 As this article has previously discussed, the “general 
effect of an order of dismissal is to restore the status quo ante; it is as 
though the bankruptcy case had never been brought.”284 Further, the Rules 
are replete with instances where the term “dismissed or closed” is used.285 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See Caviness v. England, No. CIV S-04-2388 GEB DAD PS, 2007 WL 1302522, at 
*8, *10-13 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2007) (flagging the issue but judicially estopping the former 
debtor without analyzing the effect of the previous dismissal of that debtor’s case), findings 
and recommendation adopted by 2007 WL 1577707 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2007). 
 282. See RULE 1009(a).  
 283. CODE § 350(a) (2012). 
 284. Christie v. First State Bank of Stratford (In re Keener), 268 B.R. 912, 920 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R. 188 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993)); 
see also CODE § 349; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (In re Oparaji), 698 F.3d 231, 238 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
 285. See, e.g., RULE 1017(b)(2) (beginning “[i]f the case is dismissed or closed without 
full payment of the filing fee” (emphasis added)); RULE 7004(b)(9) (stating that service may 
be made upon a debtor “until the case is dismissed or closed” (emphasis added)). 
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This indicates that the right to amend, as provided by Rule 1009, does not 
expire upon dismissal of the case, but only after such case has been 
“closed” (i.e., fully administered).286 Read together, the Code and the Rules 
seem to contemplate and approve of an amendment or addition of a later 
claim provided that such amendment or addition is done prior to full 
administration of the estate. 
Further, permitting a debtor to add a claim to her schedules in a 
subsequent bankruptcy case would potentially allow for a greater return to 
creditors if the debtor or trustee later prevails in the cause of action. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a cause of action in a debtor’s estate would 
provide an additional incentive for creditors that stand to benefit from the 
potential return to support a debtor’s successful completion of her plan.  
Thus, a debtor’s right to add a claim in a subsequent bankruptcy case not 
only encourages full disclosure, but also promotes the “two competing 
goals of bankruptcy and reorganization. One is the satisfaction of valid 
claims against the estate. The other is to allow the debtor a ‘fresh start’” 
through a discharge.287  
Furthermore, allowing a debtor to include a claim or cause of action in 
her bankruptcy schedules that she previously failed to disclose in a prior 
confirmed bankruptcy plan where such prior case was dismissed prior to 
discharge arguably does not threaten judicial integrity. Courts have held 
that no judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position may be found if such 
bankruptcy case is dismissed prior to discharge.288 
However, even if the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan constitutes 
“judicial acceptance,” the subsequent dismissal of the case without a 
discharge “undo[es] the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable, and [] 
restore[s] all property rights to the position in which they were found at the 
commencement of the case.”289 Therefore, as mentioned above, the 
subsequent dismissal negates any previous judicial acceptance.290 While 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See In re Raggie, 389 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008), for an in depth discussion 
regarding the definition of a “closed” bankruptcy case and the interplay between Rule 1009 
and Code § 350. 
 287. Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans 
Ltd. P’ship), 188 B.R. 799, 807 (E.D. La. 1995), aff’d, 116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1997); see 
also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 288. See, e.g., Stallings v. Hussman Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 289. Oparaji, 698 F.3d at 238 (quoting In re Sanitate, 415 B.R. 98, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2009)). 
 290. Id. 
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this “policy approach” may allow a debtor to benefit from an advertent 
nondisclosure, the court is certainly not left without options.291  
Hence, under this approach, one could argue that equity prevents a 
bankruptcy court from estopping a trustee or debtor292 from pursuing a 
claim—even if such claim was undisclosed in a prior confirmed plan—that 
would satisfy valid claims of the estate that may have not have otherwise 
been satisfied.293  
b) Dismissal Is Irrelevant to Judicial Acceptance 
The riposte to the argument that a subsequent dismissal should nullify 
the applicability of judicial estoppel is based on the idea that judicial 
estoppel, at least in theory, is designed to protect the integrity of the 
judiciary.294 When a bankruptcy court confirms a debtor’s plan, it makes 
that decision on the basis of all documents filed in the case, including the 
debtor’s schedules. If the court surveys the schedules and does not find, 
say, a cause of action that could be used to satisfy creditors’ claims, then 
the court will be more inclined to confirm a plan that is more favorable to 
debtors and less favorable to creditors. In this way, the court has made a 
decision on the basis of the information in the schedules and has therefore 
accepted the information within; if a cause of action is not listed, the court 
has no way of knowing that it exists. In this way, the court’s integrity has 
been damaged—it has been misled into confirming a plan that it might not 
have confirmed had the court known the true facts. This damage is not 
erased if the court dismisses the case before the debtor has completed the 
confirmed plan; the fact remains that at some point, a judge made a decision 
on the basis of information that was incomplete or inaccurate. 
A possible criticism of this approach to judicial acceptance is that it 
treats debtors and creditors too harshly. The obvious response to that 
criticism is that judicial estoppel is designed to protect the judiciary, not the 
                                                                                                                 
 291. See supra note 79. 
 292. Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petrol. Co., 145 F.3d 513, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting 
that legislative history supports the view that chapter 13 debtor’s may pursue a cause of 
action on their own); In re Wirmel, 134 B.R. 258, 260 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (noting, in 
dicta, that ownership of a cause of action ultimately belongs to the chapter 13 debtor); see 
also CODE § 1306(b) (2012). 
 293. Indeed, “[e]stopping the [t]rustee from pursuing [a claim] would thwart one of the 
core goals of the bankruptcy system—obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for 
creditors—by unnecessarily ‘vaporizing’ the assets effectively belonging to innocent 
creditors.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Biesek v. 
Soo Line R.R. Co., 440 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 294. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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parties.295 Moreover, the argument goes, if estopping a debtor for an 
inconsistent position taken in a case that has been dismissed post-
confirmation leads to harsh results, then there are other ways to mitigate 
that harshness. As this article has already advocated,296 judges are free to 
decide that the equities do not warrant the application of judicial estoppel 
even where all the judicial estoppel elements are met. As this article has 
also urged, the court should closely scrutinize whether the failure to 
disclose was advertent.297 But the court should not distort the meaning of 
judicial acceptance simply because it strikes the court as unseemly to apply 
judicial estoppel on the basis of a previously dismissed case. Judicial 
acceptance simply means: Did a judge accept the inconsistent position? 
Under this approach, if the case was confirmed, the answer to that question 
must be yes. 
c) Conclusion 
Both arguments have merit, which is why the courts have split on the 
question. Practitioners are advised to familiarize themselves with these 
arguments, utilize the one that favors their client, and prepare themselves to 
respond to the opposing side. 
8. A Brief Note on Claims Versus Assets 
The foregoing analysis has largely involved cases where debtors fail to 
disclose legal claims on their bankruptcy schedules. However, where a 
debtor fails to disclose personal property interests, or anything else of 
value, the same principles apply: 
The fact that an asset is a litigation claim, ownership of a 
corporate interest, a patent interest, real property or something 
else of value is irrelevant; what is significant is that there is a 
known asset and that the asset is disclosed for the benefit of the 
creditors. Accordingly, the . . . failure to disclose [such assets] 
involves the same principles, and is subject to the same analysis, 
as the failure to disclose litigation claims.298 
Thus, just as a practitioner should stress to her clients the importance of 
disclosing all claims, she should also ensure that her clients disclose all 
                                                                                                                 
 295. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 297. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 298. Dorbeck v. Sykora, No. 09-cv-14646, 2010 WL 3245327, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
16, 2010). 
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assets as well. Otherwise, a subsequent claim predicated on the existence of 
that nondisclosed asset could be subject to judicial estoppel. 
9. Other Recent Developments Regarding Nondisclosure 
Although a debtor is required to disclose each of her claims in 
bankruptcy or risk being judicially estopped from bringing suit on that 
claim, some courts have held that the debtor need not necessarily “identify 
every potential defendant to that claim” in her bankruptcy schedules.299 For 
instance, at least one court has held that where a debtor discloses a potential 
claim against a defendant but fails to disclose a “seemingly identical claim” 
against the individual agents of that defendant, the debtor is not judicially 
estopped from suing those individual defendants.300 The court reasoned that 
Code § 521(1) only requires the disclosure of a potential claim so that the 
court and creditors may be aware of that claim’s existence and the proceeds 
of that claim may be distributed fairly to creditors.301 It does not necessarily 
require the disclosure of anyone who might be a proper defendant to that 
claim.302 Of course, to be safe, the debtor should identify as many 
defendants as possible in her schedules. The same may not be said of the 
flipside of this scenario, however: a court has held that where a debtor-
plaintiff discloses some but not all of the types of claims she intends to 
assert against a single defendant, she will not be allowed to bring the 
nondisclosed claims.303 
Several courts have held that a debtor-plaintiff’s failure to disclose 
claims in his bankruptcy schedules is by itself insufficient to create federal 
question jurisdiction, even though bankruptcy law is exclusively federal.304 
This seems obviously correct: because judicial estoppel is a defense, it 
cannot appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint; therefore, asserting 
                                                                                                                 
 299. Nance v. City of Elgin, No. 06 CV 6608, 2008 WL 1805382, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
18, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See id. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See Wietecha v. Dollarhide Fin. Grp., Inc., No. CV 04-1862-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 
1794752, at *1-3 (D. Ariz. June 27, 2006). The plaintiff disclosed his wrongful termination 
claim against his former employer, but failed to disclose the “conceptually distinct” claims 
of defamation, negligence, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. Id. at *3. 
 304. See Nguyen v. Regions Bank, Civ. No. 1:10cv253-HSO-JMR, 2010 WL 5071173, 
at *7 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 7, 2010) (citing Champions Truck & Equip., Inc. v. Patterson, Civ. 
Action No. H-08-0108, 2008 WL 2810608, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2008)). 
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judicial estoppel on the grounds of nondisclosure in bankruptcy cannot 
confer federal arising-under jurisdiction.305 
Some courts have held that merely disclosing claims and assets to the 
trustee and creditors orally or by mail (as opposed to formally disclosing 
the claims or assets on the bankruptcy schedules) will not preclude the 
application of judicial estoppel.306 Other courts disagree and hold that 
informing the trustee of otherwise undisclosed claims or assets at the 
meeting of the creditors does indeed render judicial estoppel 
inappropriate,307 assuming that the litigant seeking to not be estopped takes 
“steps to disclose his claims to the bankruptcy court [before] circumstances 
force[] him to do so” rather than after getting caught.308 These courts reason 
that a plaintiff that places the trustee on notice is obviously not trying to 
defraud the court.309 
Where a debtor fails to disclose a claim that “would most likely be an 
exempt asset and thus would not pass on to her creditors,” some courts have 
held that judicial estoppel is unwarranted because “the threat to the integrity 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 
for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983) (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). 
 306. See, e.g., Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2012); Hamilton v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001); Arruda v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 
2:06-cv-2308-MCE-EFB, 2007 WL 754627, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007). 
 307. See, e.g., Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(debtors not judicially estopped because they “made numerous attempts through their 
counsel to advise the court and the Trustee of their claim”).  
 308. Wallace v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-875, 2007 WL 
927929, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 309. See Eubanks, 385 F.3d at 898 n.1 (citing Period Homes, Ltd. v. Wallick, 569 S.E.2d 
502 (Ga. 2002); Sports Page, Inc. v. First Union Mgmt., Inc., 438 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1989)). Another court wrote: 
[C]ourts should not apply judicial estoppel to efforts to enforce claims omitted 
from the bankruptcy petition’s schedule of assets where the debtor notified the 
trustee and all involved parties of the existence of such claims during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy case and where, therefore, it is highly unlikely that 
the omission in the petition was intentional. 
Riddle v. Chase Home Fin., No. 09-11182, 2010 WL 3504020, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 
2010) (citing Eubanks, 385 F.3d at 898-99, 898 n.1); accord Matthews v. Potter, 316 F. 
App’x 518, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that although judicial estoppel may be 
appropriate “where the debtor informed the trustee but misrepresented or denied the 
monetary value of the claims,” where there is “no suggestion” of such a misrepresentation, 
disclosure of previously undisclosed claims or assets to the trustee at the meeting of the 
creditors under Code § 341 precludes the application of judicial estoppel). 
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of the system is less than if the debtor had failed to disclose a non-exempt 
asset.”310 
At least one court, when considering whether to dismiss a case with 
prejudice due to the debtor’s bad faith where the debtor, inter alia, failed to 
timely disclose a claim, has imported elements of judicial estoppel into its 
analysis.311 In other words, the judicial estoppel analysis may be relevant 
even outside the judicial estoppel context. 
10. Judicial Estoppel Outside the Nondisclosure Context 
Judicial estoppel can be relevant in bankruptcy proceedings unrelated to 
the nondisclosure of assets or claims. In Newman v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), a chapter 7 consumer debtor participated in a religious wedding 
ceremony with the plaintiff, but did not obtain a marriage license.312 
Decades later, a state court granted the parties a divorce, pursuant to which 
the debtor-defendant was required to turn large amounts of cash and 
property over to the plaintiff.313 When the plaintiff moved to declare this 
debt nondischargeable as a nonsupport debt pursuant to a separation 
agreement314 or a domestic support obligation,315 the debtor-defendant 
argued that the debt should be deemed dischargeable because he and the 
plaintiff were never legally married.316 The court held that because the 
debtor-defendant “took the position of being legally married and thus 
created a ‘spouse’ relationship in the divorce pleadings, he [wa]s judicially 
estopped from changing that position” in the dischargeability proceeding.317 
Thus, the debtor-defendant could not argue that the plaintiff was not his 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 WL 109065, at 
*5-6 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008). See generally CODE § 522 (2012) (setting forth rules for 
exemptions in bankruptcy). But see Martin v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:04CV01527AGF, 2005 WL 
3107722, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2005) (noting that the Code “requires the scheduling of 
all assets and claims, even exempt property” (emphasis added) (citing Samore v. Graham (In 
re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Patterson 
v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992))). 
 311. See In re Watts, No. 09-35864, 2012 WL 3400820, at *4-8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 
9, 2012). 
 312. 473 B.R. 447, 451 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012). 
 313. Id. 
 314. See CODE § 523(a)(15) (2012). 
 315. See id. § 523(a)(5). 
 316. Johnson, 473 B.R. at 453. 
 317. Id. at 457. 
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former spouse, and the court therefore deemed the debt 
nondischargeable.318 
As discussed previously in the nondisclosure context, courts often find 
that the judicial acceptance element of judicial estoppel is not met when the 
initial inconsistent position was in the nature of a settlement or 
stipulation.319 The same holds true outside the nondisclosure context. In In 
re Waters, the IRS filed a motion to convert the debtor’s chapter 13 case to 
one under chapter 11.320 The debtor, the IRS, and the state taxing authority 
then agreed to a stipulation that provided that the case be converted to 
chapter 11, among other things.321 Later, the debtor alleged that the IRS 
filed false proofs of claim against him.322 Thus, argued the debtor, he was 
“entitled to be treated . . . as if he still were in chapter 13”323 under the 
theory of judicial estoppel, because the IRS’s initial motion to convert the 
case to chapter 11 was predicated upon the allegedly false proofs of 
claim.324 In dicta, the court stated that the debtor could not satisfy the 
judicial acceptance element of judicial estoppel, because “the court 
[accepted the stipulation] pursuant to the agreement of the parties and in no 
sense adopted the subject proofs of claim.”325 Thus, practitioners should not 
rely on judicial estoppel when the estoppel would be predicated upon 
assertions made in a stipulation not officially accepted by the court. 
Judicial estoppel has been analyzed in other contexts as well. For 
instance, where a servicing agent misidentifies the mortgage holder it 
represents in a state court foreclosure action, at least one court has held that 
the servicing agent is not judicially estopped from asserting that the deed of 
trust had been assigned to a different lender on whose behalf the agent filed 
a proof of a secured claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy.326 
  
                                                                                                                 
 318. Id. at 458. The court reached similar conclusions on the grounds of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, issue preclusion, and equitable estoppel. Id. at 454-57. 
 319. See supra Part I.B.7. 
 320. No. 99–31833, 2008 WL 384571, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2008), adhered to 
on denial of reconsideration in 2008 WL 4829844 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2008).  
 321. Id. at *5. 
 322. Id. at *4. 
 323. Id. at *10. 
 324. Id. at *10-11. The debtor also asserted the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel 
and fraud on the court. Id. 
 325. Id. at *11. 
 326. See Litton Loan Servicing v. Eads (In re Eads), 417 B.R. 728, 737-39 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tex. 2009). 
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a) Judicial Estoppel, Eligibility, and the Credit Counseling Requirement 
A particularly interesting judicial estoppel issue unrelated to 
nondisclosure of assets relates to the credit counseling requirements for 
consumer debtors added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).327 “The counseling 
requirement applies to individuals in all chapters.”328 Section 109(h)(1) of 
the Code currently reads: 
Subject to [exceptions not relevant here], . . . an individual may 
not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during 
the 180-day period ending on the date of filing of the petition by 
such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and 
credit counseling agency described in [Code] section 111(a) an 
individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by 
telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for 
available credit counseling and assisted such individual in 
performing a related budget analysis.329 
The “may not be a debtor under this title” language appears to create a 
mandatory bar to eligibility for consumer debtors who fail to comply with 
the credit counseling requirement.330 What happens, then, when a debtor 
asserts she is ineligible to be a debtor based on her own noncompliance 
with the credit counseling requirement? 
In re Fiorillo illustrates the issue nicely.331 “Facing imminent 
foreclosure,” the debtor in Fiorillo “filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy” in an 
attempt to “forestall the foreclosure through the automatic stay provisions 
of the [Code].”332 The debtor at no point completed the credit counseling 
requirement, although he initially submitted a document under the penalty 
                                                                                                                 
 327. CODE § 109(h) (2012). 
 328. In re Timmerman, 379 B.R. 838, 844 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007). 
 329. CODE § 109(h)(1) (emphasis added). 
 330. See, e.g., In re Fiorillo, 455 B.R. 297, 304-07 (D. Mass. 2011). 
For more in-depth analysis of Code § 109 and the various approaches as to whether and 
when dismissal is appropriate on ineligibility grounds, see Simon v. Amir (In re Amir), 436 
B.R. 1, 20-22 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010); Mendez v. Salven (In re Mendez), 367 B.R. 109 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Crawford, 420 B.R. 833, 836-41 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009); In re 
Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 301-08 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007); In re Dillard, No. 06-31028-RFH, 
2006 WL 3658485, at *1-5 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006). 
 331. Fiorillo, 455 B.R. at 298-310. 
 332. Id. at 298-99. 
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of perjury certifying that he had.333 The court then converted his case to a 
chapter 7 liquidation due to the debtor’s failure to (1) file required 
documents with the court and (2) attend the meeting of the creditors as 
required by Code § 341.334 Displeased with the prospect of facing 
liquidation, the debtor moved to dismiss the case.335 Because a chapter 7 
debtor has no right to a voluntary dismissal, the court denied the motion.336 
The debtor moved again to dismiss the case, this time “on the ground that 
he was ineligible for relief under the [Code] because he had not taken the 
required credit-counseling course prior to filing for bankruptcy.”337 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts 
denied the second motion to dismiss, and the district court affirmed.338 
Noting that a debtor is not permitted to participate in her bankruptcy case 
only to the extent that the participation benefits her,339 the court held the 
debtor was judicially estopped from asserting his ineligibility for 
bankruptcy.340 The court explained that the debtor’s 
initial representations that he complied with [Code] § 109(h) 
before filing . . . and his purported desire to cure his 
noncompliance . . . caused the Bankruptcy Court, his creditors, 
and the Trustee to proceed with the bankruptcy proceedings in 
reliance upon his contention that he was an eligible debtor. 
Permitting [the debtor] to assert now that he is ineligible would 
prejudice the creditors. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the Bankruptcy Court to deny his motion on the 
grounds of estoppel.341 
The court further held that the debtor could not be permitted to receive the 
benefits of the automatic stay without “adher[ing] to the less attractive 
                                                                                                                 
 333. Id. at 299-301. This is admittedly a bit of an oversimplification for the sake of 
clarity; for the tortured and tortuous full history of Mr. Fiorillo’s noncompliance with the 
credit counseling requirement, see id. 
 334. Id. at 299-300. 
 335. Id. at 300. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 304. 
 339. Id. at 308 (quoting Willis v. Rice (In re Willis), 345 B.R. 647, 653-54 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2006)); see also id. at 311. 
 340. Id. at 310-11. 
 341. Id. at 311. 
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obligations of a debtor.”342 Other courts agree with the Fiorillo court’s 
conclusions.343 
C. Best Practices for Practitioners 
As the foregoing amply illustrates, counsel for current and former 
debtors must be aware of the consequences and nuances of judicial 
estoppel, and inform their clients accordingly.344 Practitioners must inform 
their clients not only of their duty to disclose, but also that a clandestine and 
calculated failure to disclose will ultimately not produce financial rewards. 
                                                                                                                 
 342. Id. at 310. Compare Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-11-02279 JCS, 2011 
WL 3809808, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011), discussed supra notes 267-270 and 
accompanying text, in which the court held that judicial estoppel could not be predicated on 
the mere fact that a nondisclosing debtor had benefited from the automatic stay because the 
stay would have protected the debtor regardless of what she disclosed in her bankruptcy 
schedules. Perez and Fiorillo are not inconsistent because Fiorillo implicates issues of 
eligibility, not the sufficiency and completeness of a debtor’s schedules. Whereas a debtor 
will receive the benefit of the stay regardless of what she discloses in her schedules, a debtor 
that is completely ineligible for bankruptcy should not receive the benefit of the automatic 
stay because eligibility is a threshold the debtor must pass before qualifying for the benefits 
of bankruptcy at all. See In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 798-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). Even 
though a majority of courts have held that Code § 109(h) is nonjurisdictional and therefore 
that noncompliance with § 109(h) does not warrant automatic dismissal, see Fiorillo, 455 
B.R. at 304-07 (listing cases), eligibility is still a threshold issue in the way that disclosure of 
assets is not, and thus Perez and Fiorillo are easily reconcilable. 
 343. See In re Lilliefors, 379 B.R. 608, 610-12 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); Parker, 351 B.R. 
at 798-99; see also United States Trustee v. Winters (In re Winters), Bankr. No. 07–60786, 
Adversary No. 07–6053, 2008 WL 202774, at *5 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2008); cf. 
In re Timmerman, 379 B.R. 838, 847 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007) (involving a farm 
bankruptcy, rather than a consumer bankruptcy). 
A similar issue arises when a debtor seeks to dismiss her bankruptcy case on the grounds 
that she “failed to turn over [his or] her tax returns to the trustee timely as required by 
section 521(e)(2)(A) of the Code.” In re Fileccia, No. 06-05111, 2007 WL 1695387, at *3 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2007). Code § 521(e)(2)(B) provides that “[i]f the debtor fails to 
comply” with the tax return requirement, “the court shall dismiss the case unless the debtor 
demonstrates that the failure to so comply is due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
debtor.” CODE § 521(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Courts here have reached similar 
results: a debtor should not be permitted to abuse the bankruptcy system by dismissing a 
bankruptcy case gone sour for her own failure to comply with the Code. Fileccia, 2007 WL 
1695387, at *3-6. Though Fileccia framed its opinion as a statutory interpretation ruling 
rather than one of judicial estoppel, id. at *4, it did rely on judicial estoppel case law in 
reaching its decision, see id. at *5 (citations omitted), and its reasoning echoes that of the 
aforementioned credit counseling judicial estoppel opinions, see id. at *3-6. 
 344. See Andrew D. Mendez, Every Counsel’s Checklist: Handling a Case Involving a 
Plaintiff Who Has Filed Bankruptcy, 59 LA. B.J. 404, 405 (2012). 
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Although it is impossible to tell how often nondisclosures go undetected, it 
appears that debtors get caught hiding valuable claims all the time.345 
Furthermore, the client should be aware that the intentional failure to 
disclose an asset is bankruptcy fraud, which the court can punish “by 
revoking the debtor[‘s] discharge[] and referring [her] to the United States 
Attorney for potential criminal prosecution.”346 Also remember that other 
documents and other occasions, such as the meeting of the creditors 
pursuant to Code § 341, may require honest and forthright disclosure as 
well.347  
Given the presumption of advertence in many circuits, the client must 
also understand that even accidental failures to disclose may result in 
judicial estoppel. The client must understand that even claims lacking the 
traditional trappings of a lawsuit do indeed count for the purposes of 
judicial estoppel.348 This would include, for example, a claim filed with the 
EEOC (or its state equivalent) before receiving a right to sue letter,349 or a 
                                                                                                                 
 345. See In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 349 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) 
(“[D]ebtors are frequently estopped from asserting a claim . . . when they did not list that 
claim in their bankruptcy schedules . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Beiner & Chapman, 
supra note 1, at 14 (“In case after case, bankruptcy debtors have lost employment 
discrimination claims because they failed to disclose a pending claim, or an accrued but 
unfiled claim, on their schedule of bankruptcy assets.”). For additional support, see virtually 
every case cited in the preceding footnotes. 
 346. Biesek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 440 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 347. See, e.g., Kane v. Kane, Civ. Action No. 08-5633(FLW), 2009 WL 3208653, at *6 
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 348. “[T]he bankruptcy estate includes claims being litigated by the debtor as well as 
administrative claims.” Caviness v. England, CIV S-04-2388 GEB DAD PS, 2007 WL 
1302522, at *11 (May 3, 2007) (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 
778, 785 (9th Cir. 2001)), report and recommendation adopted by 2007 WL 1577707 (E.D. 
Cal. May 31, 2007). 
 349. In one case, the court wrote: 
The basis of Plaintiff’s contention in this regard is that she had no “claims” 
when she filled out schedules “A” and “B” because she had not yet filed the 
complaint in the instant case and because she had not yet obtained the right to 
sue letter as to individual defendant McCollough. . . . [T]he court concludes 
Plaintiff . . . had a duty to disclose . . . any potential claims she may have had 
against Defendants, including . . . the claims against McCollough, where the 
right to sue letter had not yet been issued but where the claim that was later 
asserted had already accrued and the facts upon which that claim would be 
based were known. 
Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 24, 25 (E.D. Cal. 2006); accord 
Castillo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of E. Great Lakes, Civ. Action No. 06-183, 2006 WL 
1410045, at *1 (May 22, 2006), reconsideration granted by 2006 WL 1789039 (E.D. Pa. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss3/2
2014]        RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL 521 
 
 
claim for which a complaint has not yet been filed in court.350 Even a claim 
about which the client is “uncertain[] as to the legal basis for recourse” may 
count.351 Moreover, the debtor should know that if she realizes after filing 
                                                                                                                 
June 23, 2006); Caviness, 2007 WL 1302522, at *8 (judicially estopping a plaintiff for 
failing to disclose his EEO complaints, even though plaintiff claimed “they were never 
investigated” and “no result ever came about”); see also Lewis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. 
App’x 420, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2005). 
But see FV, 349 B.R. at 187. The court in FV ultimately found judicial estoppel 
unwarranted in such circumstances: 
[A]t the time [the debtor] filed her bankruptcy, she had not yet received any 
indication from the EEOC that it was going to treat her claim favorably. In fact, 
[the debtor] did not receive her Determination Letter from the EEOC until over 
a year after she obtained her discharge. While not excusing the omission from 
the bankruptcy schedules—which require a debtor to list all claims, even those 
that are contingent and unliquidated—given the procedural posture of the claim 
at the time of the petition, [the debtor] must have considered a recovery 
extremely remote and unlikely. . . . [The debtor’s] failure to reopen her own 
bankruptcy to schedule the claim simply does not smack of the same ulterior 
motivation apparent in [cases where the court found judicial estoppel 
appropriate]. 
Id. 
A jurisdiction that has squarely adopted the presumption of advertence, however, would 
almost certainly apply judicial estoppel in such circumstances, and even the FV court 
conceded that “the omission from the [debtor’s] bankruptcy schedules” was “not 
excus[able].” Id. In short, debtors would be well-advised to schedule all claims, even those 
that do not resemble a traditional lawsuit because of their administrative law overlay. 
 350. In Rose, the court wrote:  
[A] “pending” claim . . . includes claims that have accrued as of the time of the 
bankruptcy filing regardless of whether they have been set forth in a 
complaint. . . . [T]he term “claim” incorporates any potential cause of action 
that has accrued and whose facts are sufficiently well known to the Plaintiff to 
indicate the existence of a potential asset.  
Rose, 356 B.R. at 25-26 (citations omitted). 
Some, but not all, courts hold that the duty to disclose even extends to claims that the 
debtor considers to be “only pipe dreams at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy 
schedules.” Simoneau v. Nike, Inc., No. 04-CV-1733-BR, 2006 WL 977302, at *3 (D. Or. 
Apr. 6, 2006). But see Schneider v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 05-1402-PK, 2008 
WL 109065, at *4, *6 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2008) (refusing to apply judicial estoppel where the 
debtor was led to believe that she had merely a “fairly slim chance” of succeeding on the 
nondisclosed claim, and where the debtor “was led to believe that her claim had effectively 
ended”); Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 
323 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not require debtors to list hypothetical claims that are so 
tenuous as to be fanciful . . . .”). 
 351. Smith v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, No. 03-2360 M1/AN, 2005 WL 2210208, at 
*4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2005). 
Plaintiff’s uncertainty as to the legal basis for recourse against RCG at the time 
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that she neglected to include a claim in her schedules, she must amend her 
schedules as promptly as possible.352 Whenever feasible, the debtor should 
amend the schedules before bringing suit, rather than after. 
Conversely, attorneys opposing current and former debtors should be 
aware of judicial estoppel as a tool and use it as aggressively as is 
warranted, although a practitioner should only plead judicial estoppel where 
the record truly supports it.353 The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, 
notwithstanding circuit splits and doctrinal confusion, judicial estoppel has, 
on the whole, developed into a markedly pro-creditor, pro-defendant 
doctrine; thus, creditors and defendants should utilize judicial estoppel 
accordingly. 
Those attorneys who would otherwise be entitled to use judicial estoppel 
to dismiss a case against their client must be vigilant, for “some courts view 
a defendant’s failure to plead judicial estoppel as a waiver of the affirmative 
defense,”354 and some courts have refused to apply judicial estoppel 
because, inter alia, the defendant failed to raise the defense in a timely 
                                                                                                                 
his bankruptcy petition was filed does not make his failure to disclose any 
potential claims “inadvertent” for the purposes of judicial estoppel. A debtor 
“need not know all the facts or even the legal basis for the cause of action; 
rather, if the debtor has enough information . . . prior to confirmation to suggest 
that it may have a possible cause of action,” then the debtor has a “known” 
cause of action that must be disclosed. The record indicates that Plaintiff was 
well aware of the factual basis for a “possible” cause of action against RCG at 
the time he filed his petition. Thus Plaintiff’s failure to disclose his potential 
claims cannot be considered “inadvertent” . . . . 
Id. (quoting Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 
1999)). 
 352. Beiner & Chapman, supra note 1, at 19 (“Even though Walker amended the 
schedule prior to discharge of his bankruptcy claim, the court, in essence, concluded that he 
had waited too long to do so.” (citing Walker v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
100CV0558-TWT, 2002 WL 32136202, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2002))). 
 353. See RULE 9011(b)-(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c). 
 354. Brown, supra note 12, at 201 (citing United States for Use of Am. Bank v. C.I.T. 
Constr. Inc. of Tex., 944 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1991)). Some courts hold that if a litigant 
fails to plead the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel in its responsive pleading, the 
omission constitutes a waiver of the affirmative defense unless the opposing party was not 
prejudiced by the omission, such as when the opposing party has received unequivocal 
notice of the litigant’s intent to plead judicial estoppel. See Kinnee v. Shack, Inc., Civ. No. 
07-1463-AC, 2008 WL 4899204, at *2-3 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2008) (citations omitted). But see 
Sharp v. Oakwood United Hosps., 458 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467-68 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(permitting defendants to amend answer to include affirmative defense of judicial estoppel 
where defendants “could not have sought to amend earlier” and where plaintiff made no 
showing of prejudice). 
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manner.355 A defendant seeking summary judgment on judicial estoppel 
grounds against a nondisclosing debtor-plaintiff should also make sure to 
introduce all of the debtor-plaintiff’s bankruptcy schedules into evidence, 
lest the summary judgment motion be denied.356 
Nonbankruptcy plaintiffs’ attorneys should also inquire (and then 
independently investigate) whether their client has recently gone through or 
is currently in bankruptcy.357 If yes, the practitioner should scour the 
client’s bankruptcy schedules to make sure that the claim for which the 
practitioner is currently representing the client is listed and adequately 
disclosed. If it is not, the practitioner should advise the client to promptly 
amend the schedules (reopening the case if it is closed), lest the lawsuit the 
attorney brings on the client’s behalf be dismissed on judicial estoppel 
grounds. A plaintiffs’ attorney should likewise tell the client to inform her 
if the client files bankruptcy in the future, so that the attorney can ensure 
that the client lists the pending claim on her schedules. 
If a practitioner discovers that the client has failed to disclose a cause of 
action in a prior or pending bankruptcy, and if the client refuses or fails to 
promptly reopen the bankruptcy to disclose that claim, the practitioner 
should report that nondisclosure to the trustee of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate. This is true whether the estate is currently open or closed. In several 
of the leading judicial estoppel cases, the court learned of the debtor’s 
nondisclosure in bankruptcy because either the debtor’s bankruptcy 
attorney or the attorney representing that debtor in his subsequent tort suit 
reported it to the trustee, who then moved to reopen the estate.358 The 
reason to report is not that reporting will preclude the application of judicial 
estoppel against the client—it probably won’t.359 The true reason stems 
                                                                                                                 
 355. See Valdez v. JDR LLC, No. CV 04-1620-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL 2038456, at *1-2 
(D. Ariz. July 20, 2006). 
 356. See Phillips v. Flying J Inc., 375 S.W.3d 367, 369-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). 
 357. See Mendez, supra note 344, at 405 (“The risk of faded memories (not to mention 
dissembling) suggest plaintiff and defense counsel would be wise to perform a PACER 
search as an independent means of determining whether a plaintiff has filed bankruptcy.”). 
 358. See, e.g., Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 2011); Eastman v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2007); Biesek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 
440 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 2006); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 359. See Reed, 650 F.3d at 573; Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1154; Biesek, 440 F.3d at 412. But 
see Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding debtors not 
judicially estopped because they “made numerous attempts through their counsel to advise 
the court and the Trustee of their claim”). The Eubanks court also noted that “various courts 
in other jurisdictions have held that a trustee’s knowledge of a claim precludes the 
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from self-interest and an attorney’s professional responsibilities. At least 
one court has arguably implied that an attorney’s failure to report a client’s 
prior nondisclosure immediately after discovering it may make the attorney 
an accessory to the debtor’s fraud.360 Reporting will also help ensure that 
the attorney will ultimately be paid her legal fees.361 Practitioners would 
therefore be well advised to be vigilant, prompt, and forthcoming. 
II. Equitable Estoppel 
A. Definition 
Equitable estoppel, also occasionally known as “estoppel by conduct” or 
“estoppel in pais,”362 is a defensive doctrine that prevents a party from 
unfairly taking advantage of an adverse party by inducing that adverse 
party, through false language or conduct, to act in a certain way to that 
adverse party’s injury.363 Equitable estoppel “is a defense and not an 
independent cause of action” that would “furnish a basis for damages 
claims.”364 Accordingly, some courts hold that “[i]n order for a court to 
                                                                                                                 
application of judicial estoppel since the plaintiff was obviously not trying to defraud the 
court if they placed the trustee on notice.” 385 F.3d at 898 n.1 (citing Period Homes, Ltd. v. 
Wallick, 469 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. 2002)); see also Sports Page, Inc. v. First Union Mgmt., Inc., 
438 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 360. See Biesek, 440 F.3d at 412 (“The fraud was [the debtor’s] alone. To her credit, [the 
debtor’s] bankruptcy lawyer[,] . . . who had not known about the [debtor’s] FELA claim 
until June 2003, promptly notified the Chapter 7 Trustee about the problem in [the debtor’s] 
disclosures.” (emphasis added)). To be sure, this reading of Biesek—that an attorney could 
be subject to discipline for discovering but not reporting her client’s bankruptcy fraud—is 
not inevitable, but an attorney is always well-advised to take her ethical responsibilities as 
seriously as possible. 
 361. See Reed, 650 F.3d at 576. 
 362. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 630; Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 
831, 836 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 363. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 630. 
 364. Nachar v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1021 (N.D. Ohio 2012) 
(citations omitted); accord Shatteen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civ. Action No. 
4:10cv107, 2012 WL 2524277, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2012) (“Plaintiff asserts that she is 
entitled to recover damages through the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
However, because equitable estoppel is generally defensive in character, the Court will refer 
to this cause of action as Plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel.”). But see Glazer v. 
Abercrombie & Kent, Inc., No. 07 C 2284, 2008 WL 4372032, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 
2008) (“District courts in Illinois have split on whether . . . equitable estoppel can be plead 
as [an] affirmative claim[] under Illinois law.” (citations omitted)). 
Note that a party seeking a declaratory judgment may be able to utilize an estoppel 
defense in a posture that could fairly be characterized as aggressive rather than defensive. 
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consider equitable estoppel, a party must affirmatively plead such a claim to 
give the opposing party an opportunity to conduct discovery and 
respond.”365 “[T]he party asserting such a defense . . . bears the burden of 
proof.”366 
Equitable estoppel is frequently conflated with other similar doctrines, 
including, but not limited to, collateral estoppel,367 promissory estoppel,368 
equitable tolling,369 laches,370 and ratification.371 Moreover, while courts, 
commentators, and litigants have frequently treated equitable estoppel and 
                                                                                                                 
See Nicdao v. Chase Home Fin., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073-74 (D. Alaska 2012) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2201(a)). 
 365. In re Boates, No. Civ.A. 05-4353, 2006 WL 166569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006). 
 366. Hall v. Hopkins (In re Jacobs), Bankr. No. 04–42387, Adversary No. 05–8078, 2006 
WL 4451566, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 10, 2006) (citing Dennett v. Kuenzli, 936 P.2d 
219, 224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)). 
   367.  See, e.g., Stewart v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 473 B.R. 612, 625 
n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012) (“It is not entirely clear what theory of estoppel the Debtors are 
asserting. While the Complaint recites the elements of equitable estoppel, the Debtors’ 
conclude their estoppel discussion by referring to the preclusive doctrine of ‘collateral 
estoppel.’”). 
   368.   See, e.g., Shatteen, 2012 WL 2524277, at *5 (“Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to 
recover damages through the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel. However, because 
equitable estoppel is generally defensive in character, the Court will refer to this cause of 
action as Plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel.”). 
    369.  See, e.g., Cerbone v. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 768 F.2d 45, 49-50 
(2d Cir. 1985) (“Unlike equitable tolling, which is invoked in cases where the plaintiff is 
ignorant of his cause of action because of the defendant’s fraudulent concealment, equitable 
estoppel is invoked in cases where the plaintiff knew of the existence of his cause of action 
but the defendant’s conduct caused him to delay in bringing his lawsuit.” (emphasis added)); 
Bender v. Mann, Nos. AZ–10–1121–PaJuBa, AZ–10–1122–PaJuBa, 2010 WL 6467681 at 
*9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (explaining how equitable estoppel is often confused with 
equitable tolling); Proctor v. Metro. Money Store Corp., 645 F. Supp. 2d 464, 485 (D. Md. 
2009) (“The argument by Chaudhry and Farahpour misses the mark as it concerns equitable 
estoppel more so than equitable tolling.”). 
   370.   See, e.g., United States v. Gill, No. 8:06-CV-996-T-MAP, 2007 WL 2310780, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2007) (explaining that defendant’s argument actually implicated laches, 
not equitable estoppel). 
   371. See, e.g., Hancock Bank v. Bates (In re Bates), Bankr. No. 09–51279–NPO, 
Adversary No. 09–05092–NPO, 2010 WL 2203634, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 27, 
2010) (“Hancock Bank blends its discussion of ratification with the principle of equitable 
estoppel. Equitable estoppel, however, differs from ratification in that equitable estoppel 
results from the inducement to another to act to his prejudice, whereas ratification arises out 
of confirmation after conduct.”); see also 2A N.Y. JUR.2D AGENCY § 182 (2010) 
(distinguishing ratification from estoppel). 
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judicial estoppel as equivalent, interchangeable doctrines,372 the two 
doctrines are technically 
distinct. . . . [E]quitable estoppel . . . focuses on the relationship 
between the parties and applies where one of the parties 
detrimentally has relied upon the position taken by the other 
party in an earlier proceeding. In those circumstances, the party 
that induced reliance is estopped from subsequently arguing a 
contrary position.373 
The distinction is important because the two doctrines have different 
purposes and requirements. For instance, unlike judicial estoppel,374 the 
court may not raise equitable estoppel sua sponte.375 Whereas judicial 
estoppel is designed to protect the integrity of the judiciary, equitable 
estoppel protects the parties.376 Unlike judicial estoppel, a party seeking 
equitable estoppel must therefore show that she has detrimentally relied on 
the conduct of the party to be estopped.377 Similarly, equitable estoppel is 
distinct from promissory estoppel.378 “[U]nder a theory of equitable 
estoppel, there must be reliance on a misrepresentation of past or present 
                                                                                                                 
 372. See Ajaka v. Brooksamerica Mortg. Corp., 453 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006); In 
re Alan DeAtley Litig., No. CV-06-0278-JLQ, 2008 WL 4153675, at *15 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 
29, 2008); Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. 2001); see also Chase Manhattan 
Bank, USA, N.A. v. Deuel (In re Deuel), 482 B.R. 323, 330-31 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(vacillating between equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel analysis without noting the 
distinctions between them); Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 356 B.R. 18, 23, 
26 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see also Romania v. Mattera (In re Mattera), Bankr. No. 05-39171, 
Adversary No. 07-01216, 2010 WL 148425, at *4-5 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2010) (same). 
 373. Texaco, Inc. v. Duhé, 274 F.3d 911, 923 n.16 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Edwards v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
 374. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 375. In re Boates, No. Civ.A. 05-4353, 2006 WL 166569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006) 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (2005); ADC Telecomms., Inc. v. Siecor Corp., 954 F. Supp. 820, 
825 (D. Del. 1997)). 
 376. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc., 462 F.3d 87, 93 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 377. E.g., Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 831, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2011). A movant 
seeking equitable estoppel generally cannot rely on the detrimental reliance of others with 
whom the movant is not in privity to establish her own prima facie case for estoppel. See 
Hopkins v. Idaho State Univ. Credit Union (In re Herter), 456 B.R. 455, 469 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 2011). 
 378. Promissory estoppel is “[t]he principle that a promise made without consideration 
may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably 
expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the 
promise to her detriment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 631. 
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facts, while a theory of promissory estoppel permits reliance on a 
misrepresentation of future intent.”379 Clearly, practitioners must study the 
differences between these doctrines and only plead those that actually 
apply, and courts must carefully scrutinize whether a defendant or 
counterclaimant has adequately characterized the defenses it has pled. 
Returning to equitable estoppel’s requirements, although a mere 
miscommunication between parties generally does not trigger equitable 
estoppel, most courts hold that “‘[t]here need not be actual intent to defraud 
or mislead;’ rather, ‘the estopped party need only have intended or expected 
that another would act based upon his representation.’”380 There are many 
formulations of the elements of equitable estoppel, but the following four 
elements are most common: 
 (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; 
 (2) the party to be estopped must either intend that its conduct 
will be acted upon or act in a manner that the party asserting 
estoppel has a right to believe it so intended; 
 (3) the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the true 
facts; and 
 (4) the party asserting estoppel must rely on the conduct to its 
injury.381 
Notably, some courts hold that a party may be equitably estopped not only 
on the basis of affirmative conduct and actions, but also only the basis of 
silence and inaction.382 However, “there must exist an opportunity and a 
duty to speak and knowledge that the other party is relying on that silence 
                                                                                                                 
 379. Boylston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. 22 Boylston St. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 157, 163 n.17 (Mass. 
1992) (emphasis added). 
 380. In re Toriello, No. 08-18063(DHS), 2010 WL 3943737, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2010) 
(citing In re Collier, 307 B.R. 20, 28 (D. Mass. 2004)). 
 381. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 864. In some jurisdictions, the list of elements for 
equitable estoppel articulated by the courts is nonexhaustive. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Vencor 
Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 
1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 382. See, e.g., Metal Founds. Acquisition, LLC v. Reinert (In re Reinert), Bankr. No. 11-
22840-JAD, Adversary No. 11-2656-JAD, 2012 WL 5177973, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 
18, 2012); Hancock Bank v. Bates (In re Bates), Bankr. No. 09–51279–NPO, Adversary No. 
09–05092–NPO, 2010 WL 2203634, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 27, 2010); In re Scotto, 
No. 809-75956-reg, 2010 WL 1688743, at *11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010); In re 
Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 770 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing First Union Commercial Corp. 
v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley, & Scarborough, 81 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
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to his detriment.”383 For example, a recipient’s mere nonresponse to a letter, 
unaccompanied by knowledge that the sender is detrimentally relying on 
the recipient’s silence, does not amount to the recipient’s acceptance of the 
letter’s contents for equitable estoppel purposes.384 
As in the judicial estoppel context, courts appear split regarding the 
applicable standard of review and whether the application of equitable 
estoppel is entrusted to the court’s discretion.385 “[B]ecause equitable 
estoppel is based in a court’s equitable powers, the doctrine of unclean 
hands” may preclude a court from awarding equitable estoppel to a party 
who has engaged in misconduct; “one who seeks equity must not himself be 
guilty of inequitable conduct.”386 
B. Recent Developments  
Unlike judicial estoppel, there have been comparatively few recent 
equitable estoppel developments of interest in the area of consumer 
bankruptcy. Many recent cases stand for unremarkable propositions. For 
example, a party should be estopped when it knowingly and intentionally 
makes false representations in affidavits,387 or when it fails to list known 
                                                                                                                 
 383. Timberland Bancshares, Inc. v. Garrison (In re Garrison), 462 B.R. 666, 683 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2011) (citations omitted); accord Willis v. Rice (In re Willis), 345 B.R. 
647, 652 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). 
 384. E.g., Drake v. Mass. Dep’t of Rev. (In re Drake), 434 B.R. 11, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2010). 
 385. Compare Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying de 
novo standard of review to lower court’s decision not to apply equitable estoppel), and 
O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 2009) (same), and Rossi v. 
Westenhoefer (In re Rossi), No. 11-8048, 2012 WL 913732, at *2 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Mar. 20, 
2012) (stating that equitable estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de 
novo), with O’Donnell, 466 F.3d at 1109, 1111 (reviewing lower court’s decision not to 
apply equitable estoppel for abuse of discretion). Even courts within the same circuit split on 
this question. See the discussion of this issue and the cases cited in Forester v. Chertoff, 500 
F.3d 920, 929 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 386. In re Davenport, No. 08-41213, 2011 WL 6098068, at *6 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 7, 
2011) (quoting Cox v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Cox), 408 B.R. 407, 417 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2009)); accord Tenn. Commerce Bank v. Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680, 685 (D. Vt. 2009); 
Sharpe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Sharpe), 391 B.R. 117, 166 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
2008). 
 387. See, e.g., Erickson v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Ass’n (In re Erickson), Bankr. No. 09-
11933-CAG, Adversary No. 09-01135-CAG, 2011 WL 1599657, at *4-6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
Apr. 27, 2011), aff’d in relevant part, 2012 WL 4434740, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. 2012); see also 
Nash v. Gentile, Nos. 6:08-CV-006(LEK), 6:08-CV-007(LEK), 2008 WL 3211276 
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) (finding sanctions appropriate for special counsel who sought 
equitable estoppel without a reasonable basis for doing so, where opponents engaged in no 
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creditors on its bankruptcy schedules and thereby deprives those creditors 
of sufficient notice.388 Also unlike judicial estoppel, consumer bankruptcy 
equitable estoppel cases do not split nicely into conceptually distinct 
doctrinal issues, each of which would deserve their own subsection in an 
article such as this. The best this article can do is divide the cases on the 
basis of whether or not the court ultimately applied equitable estoppel, and 
then further subdivide the cases on the basis of the identity of the party to 
be estopped.  
Moreover, as will be evident below, many recent attempts to utilize or 
expand equitable estoppel in consumer bankruptcy cases have failed; courts 
rarely find that equitable estoppel is warranted in the consumer bankruptcy 
context. This is most likely because “[t]he availability of relief” under 
equitable estoppel and its doctrinal relatives “is extremely limited.”389 This 
section nonetheless briefly discusses several recent developments and 
advises debtors’ and creditors’ attorneys alike to be aware of the 
consequences of equitable estoppel and seek ways to exploit the doctrine to 
further their clients’ goals. 
1. Equitable Estoppel Found Warranted 
a) As Against Debtors 
In In re Widner,390 the court equitably estopped a chapter 7 consumer 
debtor from objecting to the untimeliness of a creditor’s dischargeability 
complaint, because the debtor unconditionally agreed to the entry of a 
nondischargeability judgment against her prior to the deadline.391 The court 
reached this holding even though (1) a telephone message left by an 
unidentified individual from debtor’s attorney’s office manifested the 
debtor’s agreement;392 (2) the parties engaged in subsequent discussions 
regarding whether the judgment would be paid in installments and the 
amount of those installments, thereby indicating that the initial discussions 
                                                                                                                 
wrongful acts, and where the sole reason for expiration of the statute of limitations was 
party’s own negligence and failure to exercise due diligence). 
 388. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Smith (In re Smith), 379 B.R. 315, 328-29 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 389. In re Hutchins, 400 B.R. 403, 413 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009). 
 390. Eastman Credit Union v. Widner (In re Widner), Bankr. No. 09-52844, Adversary 
No. 10-5003, 2010 WL 1427300 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2010). We note that, as an 
unpublished decision, the precedential effect of Widner is limited. 
 391. Id. at *3. 
 392. Id. at *1. 
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were incomplete;393 and (3) the parties reached no explicit agreement 
regarding the accrual of interest.394 The upshot of Widner is that in some 
jurisdictions, even seemingly unresolved discussions between attorneys can 
equitably estop their clients from asserting otherwise available affirmative 
defenses. Practitioners are therefore advised to exercise caution. 
A chapter 7 debtor generally “lacks standing to appeal orders potentially 
affecting the size of her bankruptcy estate,”395 but an exception exists where 
the debtor can show an ownership interest in the asset at issue.396 However, 
when that debtor has pledged the asset at issue, such as a claim against 
another debtor’s bankruptcy estate, to support her plan, then the debtor is 
equitably estopped from asserting that she personally owns the claim and 
has standing to pursue it.397 The debtor will also be equitably estopped from 
treating her apparent pledge of the entire asset to the plan as only pledging 
part of the asset.398 
Multiple courts have held that a debtor may be equitably estopped from 
moving to dismiss an allegedly forged or unauthorized bankruptcy petition 
when she waits too long after learning about the alleged forgery before 
taking action.399 Dismissal is generally appropriate where the debtor did not 
                                                                                                                 
 393. Id. at *1, *3. 
 394. Id. at *3 (“The fact that there was no express agreement as to the accrual of interest 
does not preclude the existence of a settlement because interest automatically accrues on a 
judgment by operation of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961. In other words, by agreeing to the entry 
of a judgment against her, the Debtor implicitly agreed that the judgment would accrue 
interest.”). 
 395. Spirtos v. Ray (In re Spirtos), BAP Nos. CC–04–1621–MoBK, CC–05–1118–
MoBK, Bankr. No. LA 87–10752–AA, Adversary No. AD 02–02726–AA, 2006 WL 
6811021, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 19, 2006) (citations omitted). Note, however, that as an 
unpublished opinion the precedential value of Spirtos is limited. Id. at *1. 
 396. Id. at *8. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. The court applied judicial estoppel in this case as well. Id. 
 399. See, e.g., Willis v. Rice (In re Willis), 345 B.R. 647, 651-54 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); 
In re Scotto, No. 809-75956-reg, 2010 WL 1688743, at *12-14 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 
2010). Both of these cases alternatively held that the debtor ratified the allegedly defective 
petition. For a case reaching similar results on the grounds of ratification rather than 
estoppel, see Simon v. Amir (In re Amir), 436 B.R. 1, 17-20 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010). 
Scotto also presents another important takeaway for practitioners, albeit one that should go 
without saying: do not file bad faith bankruptcies for your clients that you have no intention 
of pursuing to completion for the sole purpose of stalling litigation. See Scotto, 2010 WL 
1688743, at *5. Likewise, an attorney who files a bankruptcy petition without the debtor’s 
signature may be subject to sanctions pursuant to Rule 9011. Willis, 345 B.R. at 651 n.10 
(citing Briggs v. Labarge (In re Phillips), 433 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
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sign the petition.400 However, if the debtor delays challenging the petition 
and thereby enjoys the benefits of bankruptcy (such as the automatic stay) 
without suffering from the detriments, then the debtor will be equitably 
estopped from asserting deficiencies in her petition and schedules as a 
ground for dismissal.401 
Although debtors are most often estopped for nondisclosures on their 
bankruptcy schedules under the rubric of judicial estoppel, they may also be 
equitably estopped for their failures to disclose if the elements of equitable 
estoppel are satisfied.402 
b) As Against Trustees 
At least one court has held that a chapter 7 trustee may be bound to an 
arbitration clause in a contract “to the same extent” that the debtor is bound 
under equitable estoppel.403 
In one case, a court equitably estopped a chapter 7 trustee from moving 
to dismiss a consumer debtor’s case for failure to file payment advices with 
the bankruptcy clerk pursuant to Code § 521.404 The debtor physically 
handed the advices to the trustee to examine at the first meeting of the 
creditors.405 The trustee returned the advices to the debtor without 
informing him that giving the advices to the trustee was no substitute for 
filing them with the clerk.406 The court ruled that 
[b]y closing the first meeting and returning the payment advices 
without comment, the trustee provided adequate justification for 
debtor’s counsel to believe that no further issue existed with 
regard to the payment advices. For these reasons, the trustee is 
appropriately estopped from now moving for dismissal of this 
case due to a failure to complete the timely filing of those same 
documents.407 
                                                                                                                 
 400. E.g., Willis, 345 B.R. at 651. 
 401. See id. 
 402. See, e.g., Metal Founds. Acquisition, LLC v. Reinert (In re Reinert), Bankr. No. 11-
22840-JAD, Adversary No. 11-2656-JAD, 2012 WL 5177973, at *1-9 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 18, 2012). 
 403. Stalzer v. BDO Seidman LLP (In re Watson), Nos. 02-96223, 1:05-cv-1117-WSD, 
2006 WL 1566968, at *4 n.3 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 28, 2006). 
 404. In re Gilbert, 403 B.R. 297, 300 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 405. Id. at 298. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 299. 
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Thus, trustees should carefully consider whether their actions (or non-
actions) could later give rise to equitable estoppel. 
c) Against Creditors 
In Wallach v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Sheppard),408 the 
chapter 7 trustee of a consumer debtor’s estate brought a “strong-arm” 
proceeding409 under Code § 544 in order to avoid a mortgage based on the 
lender’s error in recording a copy that the debtor had not signed.410 The case 
had previously been closed, but after learning about a potential defect in the 
lender’s mortgage, the trustee successfully moved to reopen the case.411 The 
lender argued that Code § 546(a) barred the trustee’s avoidance action, 
which section “essentially provides that a trustee may not commence an 
avoidance action under [Code] section 544 after . . . the time that the case is 
closed,” inter alia.412 Whereas ordinarily “this prior closing of the case 
[would] have precluded any avoidance action,”413 in this case the lender 
had previously moved for relief from the automatic stay of 
[Code] § 362. That motion made no reference to the recording 
defect or to the fact that [the lender’s] pre-petition complaint had 
sought both to foreclose and to correct the error. As an exhibit to 
its motion, [the lender] attached a copy not of the unsigned 
mortgage of record, but of an unrecorded mortgage with the 
debtor’s full signature. By reason of this selective presentation, 
[the lender] effectively camouflaged a serious title problem. If 
the motion had alerted the trustee to that problem, then 
presumably the trustee would not have allowed the case to 
close.414 
As a result, the court concluded that “principles of equitable estoppel” 
would preclude the lender “from asserting the bar of the earlier closing of 
this case.”415 Sheppard necessarily stands for the proposition that, in 
                                                                                                                 
 408. 471 B.R. 45 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 409. For an explanation of what a strong-arm proceeding entails, see Al Teel, Comment, 
Why Are Chapter 13 Debtors Still “Standing” in Their Battle for Trustee’s Avoidance 
Powers?: A Call to Resolve the Current Circuit Split, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 311, 323-24 (2013). 
 410. Wallach, 471 B.R. at 47-48. 
 411. Id. at 47. 
 412. Id. at 48. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
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appropriate circumstances, the judicially created principles of equitable 
estoppel can trump the congressionally enacted sections of the Code.416 
Where a lender sends a letter to a debtor that falsely suggests that the 
lender holds the debtor’s loan, such that the debtors are thereby prevented 
from “learn[ing] of the [true holder’s] identity until it [is] too late to 
rescind,” the lender may be equitably estopped “from denying that it was a 
holder (i.e., a creditor)” of the loan under the Truth in Lending Act.417  
Courts have applied equitable estoppel against creditors in other ways. For 
instance, where a creditor permissibly repossesses a consumer debtor’s 
vehicle without seeking relief from the automatic stay due to a statutory 
exception to the stay, but the creditor has previously misinformed the 
debtor that it would seek relief from the stay before repossessing the 
property, the creditor may be equitably estopped.418 The creditor may be 
deemed liable for the loss of the debtor’s personal property located within 
the repossessed vehicle that the debtor would have removed had he known 
the vehicle would be repossessed without legal process.419 
A creditor has been equitably estopped from denying a debtor’s 
ownership interest in property when it “s[a]t on its rights and collect[ed] 
payments from the [d]ebtor” rather than her ex-husband and “elected to 
remain silent when it had the right to initiate a foreclosure proceeding.”420 
Likewise, a creditor may be equitably estopped from challenging its 
                                                                                                                 
 416. Cf. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367-76 (2007) (reading bad 
faith exceptions into the Code). 
 417. See Meyer v. Argent Mortg. Co. (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 551-54 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2007). 
 418. Heflin v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (In re Heflin), 464 B.R. 545, 555-56 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2011). 
 419. Id. at 556. 
 420. In re Nunnery, No. 11-80267, 2011 WL 4712083, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 
2011). 
The [d]ebtor made the monthly payments to [the creditor] and maintained the 
property for seven years after [debtor’s ex-husband] ceased residing in the 
manufactured home. . . . [The creditor] knew of the situation. . . . The [d]ebtor 
continued to make the monthly payments to [the creditor] in reliance that she 
would be permitted to continue residing in the manufactured home with her two 
minor children. Despite knowing that [the applicable contract] prevented 
[debtor’s ex-husband] from transferring any interest in the manufactured home 
[to the debtor or anyone else] without [the creditor’s] consent, [the creditor] 
was content to sit on its rights. . . . Consequently, . . . the [d]ebtor is the 
equitable owner of the manufactured home and [the creditor] holds a claim 
against the [d]ebtor’s estate. 
Id. 
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classification as unsecured when it fails to take any action whatsoever in the 
bankruptcy proceeding until after the debtor has received a discharge, 
despite having notice and actual knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy.421 
The upshot is that creditors must be vigilant and promptly bring whatever 
challenges they have during the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, not 
afterwards. 
2. Equitable Estoppel Found Unwarranted422  
a) Debtors’ Estoppel Claims Failed Because No Reasonable Reliance 
Found 
In Thornton v. Western & Southern Financial Group Beneflex Plan, an 
employee alleged that his employer represented that he would receive long-
term disability benefits under the terms of his disability insurance plan, 
when in reality the plan’s unambiguous terms clearly provided otherwise.423 
The employee claimed that his employer “intended for him to rely on these 
representations, and he did so to his detriment, ultimately resulting in his 
declaration of bankruptcy.”424 The court held that, the employee’s 
bankruptcy filing notwithstanding, equitable estoppel did not prevent the 
employer “from denying [the employee’s] long-term disability benefits 
based on the pre-existing condition exclusion contained in the Plan.”425 
Because “[p]rinciples of estoppel . . . cannot be applied to vary the terms of 
unambiguous plan documents,” the employee’s “[r]eliance on statements 
suggesting the contrary was not reasonable or justifiable.”426 
Where a creditor files an inflated proof of claim with respect to a lease in 
a debtor’s bankruptcy, that inflated filing “does not equate to altering the 
                                                                                                                 
 421. In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 765, 770-71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 422. For additional cases in which courts found equitable estoppel unwarranted, see, for 
example, Tenn. Commerce Bank v. Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680, 685 (D. Vt. 2009); Hopkins v. 
Idaho State Univ. Credit Union (In re Herter), 456 B.R. 455, 469-71 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011); 
Shuman v. Allan (In re Allan), 449 B.R. 628, 638 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009); In re Shethi, 389 
B.R. 588, 606-07 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding debtors not equitably estopped from 
amending exemption schedule); In re Foth, No. 06-10696, 2007 WL 4563434, at *7 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2007); Hall v. Hopkins (In re Jacobs), Bankr. No. 04–42387, Adversary 
No. 05–8078, 2006 WL 4451566, at *5-6 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 10, 2006) (finding plaintiff 
did not relinquish or waive security interest in car and proceeds). 
 423. 797 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805-06 (W.D. Ky. 2011). 
 424. Id. at 806. 
 425. Id. at 805. 
 426. Id. (quoting Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
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terms of the Lease”427 under equitable estoppel principles because the 
debtors “could not have ‘reasonably relied’ upon [the creditor’s] proof of 
claim because [the debtors] knew at all times what the terms of their Lease 
were.”428 In such circumstances, the debtors “may not rely upon an 
equitable estoppel argument to prevent [the creditor] from amending its 
proof of claim.”429 
b) Estoppel Against the Government May Require a Heightened 
Standard 
Several courts have recently reaffirmed that in order to equitably estop 
the government in a consumer bankruptcy case, such as when the IRS files 
a tax deficiency claim, the party seeking to estop the government must 
satisfy a heightened standard and show “some misrepresentation” or 
“affirmative misconduct”430 that rises above the level of mere negligence.431 
For example, a court found equitable estoppel against the government 
unwarranted where the debtor 
argue[d] only that the government-issued schedule for his 
Chapter 11 payments led him to believe that by abiding by the 
schedule all of his tax liabilities would be discharged. The 
schedule itself, however, d[id] not suggest this conclusion, and 
the facts show[ed] that the government did not neglect its efforts 
to collect the amounts not covered by the bankruptcy case or 
mislead Defendant into believing it would do so.432 
                                                                                                                 
 427. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp. v. Presco (In re Presco), Bankr. No. 08-
20390JAD, 2009 WL 8556808, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009). 
 428. Id. at *4. 
 429. Id. 
 430. E.g., In re Rodriguez, 387 B.R. 76, 92 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 431. O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Rojas-Reyes 
v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 2000)); accord United States v. Campbell, No. 
5:09CV00469(ERW), 2010 WL 3996600, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010); United States v. 
Gill, No. 8:06-CV-996-T-MAP, 2007 WL 2310780, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2007); Drake 
v. Mass. Dep’t of Rev. (In re Drake), 434 B.R. 11, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010). But see In re 
Breland, No. 09-11139-11-MAM, 2011 WL 6739514, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 
2011) (holding the IRS was equitably estopped without a showing or analysis of affirmative 
misconduct). 
 432. Gill, 2007 WL 2310780, at *3. Indeed, the court in Gill suggested that the facts 
would not even permit the defendant-debtor to satisfy even “the lower, traditional equitable 
estoppel elements” applied to ordinary, nongovernmental litigants. Id. The court further 
noted that the defendant-debtor’s argument was more appropriately deemed a laches 
argument than an equitable estoppel argument. Id. 
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Similarly, “[d]elay by the government in furnishing a taxpayer[-debtor] the 
information needed to file a refund claim generally does not rise to the level 
of affirmative misconduct” necessary to justify a chapter 7 trustee’s claim 
of equitable estoppel when objecting to a proof of claim filed by the IRS; 
“nor does it justify the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.”433 
c) Issues Regarding Trustees 
At least one court has held, however, that no such heightened standard 
applies to a chapter 7 trustee, as a chapter 7 trustee is “an independent 
fiduciary, and not . . . an instrumentality of any governmental unit.”434 Not 
all courts agree; some have suggested that “compelling circumstances” 
must be shown before a chapter 7 trustee may be equitably estopped.435 
A bankruptcy appellate panel has also held that an arguably lackadaisical 
chapter 7 trustee would not be equitably estopped from claiming ownership 
of a chapter 7 consumer debtor’s state court cause of action, even though 
the trustee “was required to expeditiously liquidate or abandon property of 
the estate,” and “could have been more diligent in his investigation” and 
closing of the bankruptcy case, because there was no suggestion that the 
trustee “ke[pt] the case open for an improper purpose.”436 
                                                                                                                 
 433. Rodriguez, 387 B.R. at 92-93 (citations omitted). The court further held that the 
trustee could not demonstrate detrimental reliance. Id. at 93. 
 434. In re Gilbert, 403 B.R. 297, 299 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009). The court went on to 
explain that “even if the case trustee were deemed to fulfill some governmental function, his 
actions in the present instance do not represent the fulfillment of any statutory duty.” Id. 
 435. One court wrote the following: 
In addition to the legal justifications for not estopping Trustee from performing 
his duties as a chapter 7 case trustee in this case, there are strong policy reasons 
against doing so. A “prime bankruptcy policy” is to achieve equality of 
distribution among creditors of a debtor. The chapter 7 trustee system helps 
sustain that policy by preventing a race to obtain and liquidate assets by 
individual creditors, and by providing representation to creditors who might not 
otherwise be able to afford to participate in the distribution process. Allowing 
an individual creditor, or a subset of creditors, to prevent a trustee from 
fulfilling his statutory duties to the bankruptcy estate based upon his personal 
conduct would frustrate one of the [Code’s] primary tools to ensure the 
protection of all creditors’ rights, and should not be supported by the Court 
absent compelling circumstances. 
Hopkins v. Idaho State Univ. Credit Union (In re Herter), 456 B.R. 455, 471 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 2011) (citations omitted). 
 436. Slates v. Reger (In re Slates), BAP No. EC–12–1168–KiDJu, Bankr. No. 10–
22970–CMK, 2012 WL 5359489, at *9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2012). 
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At least one court has held that equitable estoppel is an inappropriate tool 
for shifting liability for a chapter 7 trustee’s attorney fees to a lender when 
that lender includes its own request for attorney fees in its complaint in an 
adversary proceeding.437 
In In re Davenport, chapter 13 debtors discussed their initial proposal to 
abandon certain real property with the chapter 13 trustee at the initial 
meeting of creditors.438  
Because he did not consider himself a “liquidating trustee,” 
however, the Trustee informed them that he would not accept the 
transfer of the property, and liquidate it, for the benefit of 
creditors. The Trustee did, however, inform the Debtors that 
because the plan payments proposed by them . . . were sufficient 
to satisfy the best interest of the creditors test without the sale of 
this property, there was no need to liquidate [the debtors’] 
interest in the land. Debtors agreed to amend their plan to 
remove the “abandonment” language, and that plan was 
confirmed in December 2008 without objection.439 
Subsequent to confirmation, the debtors sold the real property for a 
substantial windfall440 without seeking court approval or informing the 
                                                                                                                 
 437. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A. v. Deuel (In re Deuel), 482 B.R. 323, 329-30 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012). The court noted: 
 The Trustee argues that the estate is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees based on 
principles of estoppel. He argues first that Chase unequivocally demanded 
attorneys’ fees in its complaint and in the bankruptcy court’s order and 
judgment. He, thereafter, argues generally and generically that estoppel applies. 
The Court determines that these arguments fail. . . . 
 Estoppel theory states: “If one merely alleges a right to recover attorneys’ 
fees one is estopped from contending that he or she could not recover them if 
the other party prevails and claims attorneys’ fees.” 
 The Court determines that the estoppel theory is an inappropriate vehicle for 
shifting liability for attorneys’ fees in any event and particularly so given the 
equivocal nature of the attorneys’ fees “demand” and “award” in this case. 
Instead, attorneys’ fees, if awarded, must be otherwise recoverable by contract, 
statute, or at law. 
Id. 
 438. No. 08-41213, 2011 WL 6098068, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 439. Id. 
 440. The court noted: 
[I]n 2010, Mrs. Davenport and her siblings were contacted by the Kansas 
Department of Transportation (“KDOT”) because KDOT intended to acquire 
the land for a highway project. In a letter dated November 2010, KDOT offered 
Mrs. Davenport and her siblings $776,895 for the land—more than 15 times the 
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court or the trustee, and went on a spending spree.441 The trustee moved to 
compel the debtors to turn over the proceeds from the property sale.442 The 
debtors argued that the trustee was equitably estopped from doing so443 “as 
a result of the Trustee’s decision not to require [the real property to] be sold 
prior to plan confirmation.”444 The debtors considered the trustee to have 
abandoned the asset445 and thought the money was theirs to fritter away as 
they wished.446 The court apoplectically disagreed.447 For one, the trustee 
“did not abandon the property”—indeed, he “informed the [debtors] that 
they could not abandon the property to him to liquidate.”448 Thus, there was 
“nothing improper about the information provided by the Trustee to the 
[debtors].”449 Moreover, the debtors were barred from asserting equitable 
estoppel by the aforementioned doctrine of unclean hands.450 Though the 
                                                                                                                 
previously appraised value of the land. 
Id. 
 441. Id. at *1-2. Specifically, the debtors  
took a vacation in Hawaii, purchased a newer vehicle, fixed up their home, 
built an expensive garden shed, bought new furniture and high-end appliances, 
and even used some of the proceeds to make their Chapter 13 plan payments 
and cover their monthly living expenses—begging the question what they did 
with their ordinary monthly income of at least $2,225. 
Id. at *7. 
 442. Id. at *1. 
 443. Id. at *6. 
 444. Id. at *2. 
 445. Id. at *6. 
 446. Id. at *2. 
 447. Id. at *6-7. The court raged: 
[The d]ebtors . . . are like the children who have been caught eating the 
prohibited cookies from the family cookie jar. Although at the point they were 
caught they had eaten 90% of the cookies, they wish to eat the few that remain 
even though that will deprive the rest of the family of their share. This I will 
not, and cannot, allow. 
Id. at *7. 
 448. Id. at *6. 
 449. Id. 
 450. The court found the facts of the case egregious:  
 I find the [debtors’] decision to spend these estate assets, especially after the 
Trustee filed his motion for turnover, simply inexcusable. . . . 
 [A]fter deducting taxes, the [debtors] received almost $114,000 from the 
land sale. That is equivalent to two and one-half year’s income for these 
Debtors. They could have paid 100% of their claims . . . and still emerged from 
under this Chapter 13 proceeding completely debt free (including their home 
and two or three cars), and still had $24,000 (or over six months of net income) 
remaining. . . .  
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facts of Davenport are undoubtedly extreme, practitioners and trustees can 
hopefully apply its teachings to less extreme fact situations, and debtors’ 
attorneys can use Davenport as a cautionary tale for advising their clients 
how not to act. 
d) Special Issues with Creditors 
The potential to apply equitable estoppel arises when a lender, by its 
representations, promises, or actions, induces a would-be debtor not to file 
bankruptcy.451 However, at least one court has indicated452 that when that 
would-be debtor would not have filed bankruptcy even in the absence of the 
lender’s actions and representations because, due to her lack of 
sophistication and legal knowledge, she did not believe she was eligible for 
bankruptcy, the lender may not be equitably estopped.453 The would-be 
debtor could not possibly prove reliance on the lender’s actions and 
representations.454  
The flipside of this scenario occurs when a lender argues that it agreed to 
“continue[] to advance monies for taxes that the Debtor failed to pay 
notwithstanding the entry of a foreclosure judgment” in reliance on the 
“Debtor’s promise to file a Chapter 13 plan that would provide for [the 
lender’s] presumably arrears claim and make current post-petition mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 But that was not how the [debtors] elected to proceed. . . .  
 In approximately eleven months, the [debtors] managed to spend almost 
$100,000 from the sale of the land, plus at least $24,475 from their ordinary 
earnings . . . . The only effort they made to pay any of this windfall to their 
creditors was to make their required monthly Chapter 13 plan payments . . . . 
 To make matters worse, the [debtors] did not inform the Court or the 
Trustee of the sale of this land or seek the required Court approval. This 
deprived the Trustee and creditors of the ability to capture more of the funds for 
the benefit of creditors. 
 The [debtors] are, in no way, entitled to the Court’s equity under these facts. 
Id. at *6-7. 
 451. See Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mitchell), 476 B.R. 33, 45 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2012). 
 452. We use the word “indicated” rather than “ruled” because Mitchell involved a non-
core proceeding in which a party did not consent to the bankruptcy court issuing a final 
order. As a result, the court’s decision was “submitted to the district court as proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and [Rule] 9033.” 
Id. at 37. At the time of this writing, there is no indication whether the district court has 
accepted or rejected the bankruptcy court’s findings and conclusions. 
 453. Id. at 45. 
 454. Id. 
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payments.”455 Where the lender “provide[s] no evidence that it had been 
induced into making the advances by Debtor’s conduct,”456 it cannot make 
a claim for those escrow advances in the debtor’s bankruptcy on the 
grounds of equitable estoppel.457 
At least one court has recently reaffirmed that, under equitable estoppel 
principles, “a creditor does not waive the right to act on a future default by 
accepting payment of a past default.”458 
III. Conclusion 
As the foregoing demonstrates, with few exceptions, the doctrine of 
estoppel is in a state of flux. There is plenty of wiggle room for creative 
practitioners to develop these doctrines in innovative ways that serve their 
                                                                                                                 
 455. In re Miles, 400 B.R. 441, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. at 443-46. The court explained: 
[The lender] points to the undisputed fact that Debtor has filed three Chapter 13 
cases since the judgment was entered which provided for a cure of arrears and 
resumption of post-petition payments. Moreover, it entered into the Filing 
Stipulation agreeing to the new case upon the Debtor’s promise to file a 
Chapter 13 plan that would provide for its presumably arrears claim and make 
current post-petition mortgage payments. [The lender] argues that it relied on 
these commitments and continued to advance monies for taxes that the Debtor 
failed to pay notwithstanding the entry of a foreclosure judgment. Notably [the 
lender] provided no evidence that it had been induced into making the advances 
by Debtor’s conduct. An equally plausible explanation for its decision to pay 
real estate taxes and insurance premiums was a desire to protect its collateral. 
Moreover, the Debtor’s election to propose a plan that would retire the debt 
instead of reinstate the mortgage was permissible under the [Code] and the 
Filing Stipulation. While that document stated that Debtor was required to file a 
plan that would provide for [the lender’s] anticipated proof of claim in the 
amount of $48,000, it expressly allowed Debtor the right to review the claim 
when it was filed and object as appropriate. The Filing Stipulation did not 
require Debtor to pay the escrow component of its claim if she chose not to 
reinstate the Mortgage nor require Debtor to file an arrears plan. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that [the lender] ever considered, let alone discussed with 
Debtor, the reimbursement of post-judgment advances in the event she filed a 
full payment plan. In short, I have no way of knowing what [the lender] would 
have done had it been aware that the Mortgage would not be reinstated through 
an arrears plan. 
Id. at 445. 
 458. Sharpe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Sharpe), 391 B.R. 117, 165 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 2008) (applying Alabama law). 
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clients, be they debtors or creditors, plaintiffs or defendants, or trustees.459 
Hopefully this article can assist that development in ways that are sensible, 
coherent, and consistent. In the following volume, we will engage in a 
similar analysis of preclusion doctrines in consumer bankruptcy cases. 
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 459. That said, of course, we caution against the abusive use of preclusive doctrines. One 
should only plead them if they are supportable. See RULE 9011(b)-(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-
(c). Estoppel and preclusion should not become stock, kneejerk arguments that are employed 
every time an opposing party is haled into court against its will in the way that Stern v. 
Marshall objections are often reflexively raised in bankruptcy courts nowadays. See, e.g., In 
re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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